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THE MYSTERY OF UNANIMITY IN  
HOSANNA-TABOR EVANGELICAL  
LUTHERAN CHURCH & SCHOOL V. EEOC 
by 
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle* 
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. 
EEOC, decided in 2012, the Supreme Court held that the First Amend-
ment supports a “ministerial exception” defense in anti-discrimination 
suits by clergy against their institutional religious employers.  In advance 
of the decision, the outcome seemed unpredictable, and the Court’s una-
nimity arrived as a shock. 
This paper illuminates the result, reasoning, and unanimity in Hosan-
na-Tabor. We explain how Hosanna-Tabor stands in a long line of 
decisions, grounded in both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exer-
cise Clause, that prohibit state adjudication of “strictly and purely eccle-
siastical” questions. 
Part I examines why unanimity on the Supreme Court seemed highly im-
probable.  Other divisions on the Court in Religion Clause cases, the 
brooding omnipresence of Employment Division v. Smith, and the 
persistent feminist critique of the ministerial exception all suggested that 
complete agreement within the Court was unlikely. Part II focuses on the 
key features of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court in Hosanna-
Tabor, including the central question of which Religion Clause is doing 
the primary work. Part III offers our explanation and defense of the ex-
ception’s jurisprudential foundation, and shows in detail how the courts 
– before and after Hosanna-Tabor – have steadfastly maintained that
foundation and its relevant boundaries. 
Part IV highlights the intense and continued division within the acade-
my on the meaning and correctness of Hosanna-Tabor. Part IV A ana-
lyzes the work of “the Expanders,” who see Hosanna-Tabor as a signifi-
*
The authors are both affiliated with George Washington University. Ira C. Lupu 
is the F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor Emeritus of Law; Robert W. Tuttle is the 
David R. and Sherry Kirschner Berz Research Professor of Law and Religion. We are 
grateful to Axel Schamis, a member of the class of 2018 at the George Washington 
University Law School, for valuable assistance with research for this piece; and to Rick 
Garnett, Fred Gedicks, Doug Laycock and Jim Oleske for helpful comments.  
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cant sign that the First Amendment protects a broad freedom of religious 
entities to resist general regulation.  Part IV.B focuses on “the Re-
Rationalizers,” who seek to disconnect Hosanna-Tabor from religion-
specific norms, and ground the ministerial exception in the freedom of 
association.  Part IV.C turns to “the Dissenters,” who argue that the 
ministerial exception is not required by the Constitution and is profound-
ly misguided. Whether designed to build up the decision or tear it down, 
the scholars’ overstated claims about Hosanna-Tabor may resonate 
within the culture wars, but have no foundation in the governing law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
[After oral argument and before decision in Hosanna-Tabor], 
neither side could confidently count to five . . . . [N]o one who 
heard the oral argument would have predicted unanimity.
1
 
Professor Douglas Laycock 
This Symposium’s theme of polarization on issues of law and religion 
evokes an image of a deeply and irrevocably divided Supreme Court, mir-
rored in a comparable split in the legal academy. The recent decisions in 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
2
 and Town of Greece v. Galloway
3
 perfectly 
1
Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 840, 859 (2012). Professor Laycock represented Hosanna-Tabor in the 
U.S. Supreme Court. He was the principal author of its Supreme Court brief and 
presented the oral argument on its behalf. 
2
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
3
134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
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embody that image. Both produced 5–4 decisions from the Court, and 
strenuous disagreement among legal scholars.
4
 
At times, however, outliers from the normal pattern offer more re-
vealing insights than the typical left-right split. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC
5
 presents a perfect opportunity for re-
flection on the significance of a decision that departs from the usual sto-
ry. In Hosanna-Tabor, the Justices unanimously declared both the exist-
ence and broad scope of a ministerial exception to laws regulating some 
employment relationships in religious institutions.
6
 As canvassed in Part 
IV below, scholars have offered an incredibly wide range of views, from 
broad expansion to utter repudiation, of the ministerial exception. De-
spite the plausibility of many positions within that scholarly range, the 
Justices nevertheless adhered to a longstanding principle, and agreed 
completely on a series of essential points and supporting reasons. 
This paper interrogates the meaning of that unanimity, and seeks to 
explain why so many scholars refuse to accept the principle that explains 
it. Hosanna-Tabor stands in a long line of decisions, grounded primarily in 
the Establishment Clause, that prohibit state adjudication of “strictly and 
purely ecclesiastical”
7
 questions. Part I explores the litigation in Hosanna-
Tabor as it appeared on the eve of decision, and examines why eventual 
unanimity on the Supreme Court seemed so unlikely. The brooding om-
nipresence of Employment Division v. Smith,
8
 and the persistent feminist 
 
4
With respect to Hobby Lobby, compare Kevin Walsh, Symposium: Looking Forward 
from the Supreme Court’s Important but Unsurprising Hobby Lobby Decision, SCOTUSblog 
(July 1, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/07/symposium-looking-forward-from-
the-supreme-courts-important-but-unsurprising-hobby-lobby-decision/, with Ira Lupu & 
Robert Tuttle, Symposium: Religious Questions and Saving Constructions, SCOTUSblog 
(Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/symposium-religious-questions-
and-saving-constructions. With respect to Town of Greece, compare Richard Garnett, 
Symposium: Religious Pluralism, Civic Unity, and the Judicial Role, SCOTUSblog (May 8, 
2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/05/symposium-religious-pluralism-civic-unity-
and-the-judicial-role, with Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: Dismantling the Wall That 
Should Separate Church and State, SCOTUSblog (May 6, 2014), http://www.scotusblog. 
com/2014/05/symposium-dismantling-the-wall-that-should-separate-church-and-state/. 
5
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 
(2012). 
6
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kagan, authored a concurring opinion, urging 
sensitivity to the varieties of titles and roles among faith communities in the 
designation of those with responsibility for teaching the faith. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 
U.S. at 188–89 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurring 
opinion, urging deference to religious entities in the designation of which employees 
fell within the ministerial exception. Id. at 196–97 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
Nevertheless, all nine Justices joined in full the Court opinion, authored by Chief 
Justice Roberts. 
7
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1871). 
8
494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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critique of the ministerial exception, were most prominent among the 
reasons for expected division on the Court. 
Part II focuses on the key features of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion 
for the Court in Hosanna-Tabor, including the question of which Religion 
Clause better supported the exception, and the place of Smith in under-
standing the Free Exercise component of the case. Part III offers our ex-
planation of the dominant jurisprudential foundation of the exception, 
and shows how the Supreme Court and lower courts have steadfastly 
maintained that foundation and its relevant boundaries. 
Part IV examines the work of other scholars, whom we divide into 
several basic camps, on the subject of the ministerial exception. Part 
IV.A. analyzes the work of the “Expanders,” a group of scholars who see 
Hosanna-Tabor as a significant sign that the First Amendment protects a 
broad immunity of religious entities from general regulation. Part IV.B. 
focuses on the “Re-Rationalizers,” who seek to disconnect Hosanna-Tabor 
from religion-specific norms, and to ground the ministerial exception in 
a general freedom of association, expressive or relational. Part IV.C. 
turns to the “Dissenters,” who argue that the ministerial exception in 
general, and Hosanna-Tabor in particular, are profoundly misguided. We 
hope the paper illuminates the reasons for continued polarization within 
the academy on a question that the Court’s unanimous opinion should 
have put to rest. 
I. HOSANNA-TABOR AND UNEXPECTED JUDICIAL UNANIMITY 
If the work of lower courts were a perfect guide to Supreme Court 
outcomes, no one would have been shocked at a unanimous ruling in 
support of a ministerial exception.
9
 Virtually every federal appellate cir-
cuit, and every state supreme court that had confronted the question, 
recognized the proposition that the Religion Clauses insulate religious 
entities from certain causes of action by employees primarily responsible 
for communicating the faith.
10
 Many of the cases involve claims of em-
ployment discrimination, including matters of race, and many decisions 
extend the boundaries of the ministerial exception beyond those who 
serve in conventional roles as clergy in houses of worship.
11
 Even after the 
 
9
The Court might have divided over questions about whether Perich’s position 
qualified for the exception, but not over the basic question of whether the 
Constitution required a ministerial exception in at least some instances. 
10
The federal court of appeals decisions are cited in Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 
188 n.2. We collect a number of the state decisions in Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. 
Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between Religious Institutions and Their 
Leaders, 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 119, 127 n.51 (2009). 
11
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10, at 127 n.53.  
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1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith, that consistent pattern in 
the state and lower federal courts did not change in the slightest.
12
 
Nevertheless, as expressed by Professor Laycock in the quote with 
which we begin this Article, the uncertainty across the academy about 
how the Supreme Court would treat the ministerial exception was wide-
spread. The reasons are not difficult to understand. First, the Court had 
never expressed a view on the ministerial exception as such. The idea of 
a ministerial exception first appeared in the law in the Fifth Circuit’s de-
cision in McClure v. Salvation Army,
13
 and in the ensuing 40 years the Su-
preme Court never made any explicit reference to the exception.
14
 
Second, although Employment Division v. Smith had distinguished sev-
eral cases involving disputes over church property and personnel,
15
 Smith 
cut hard against any notion that the Free Exercise Clause supported reli-
gion-based exemptions from generally applicable laws. The civil rights 
laws of the United States, and of the states, certainly fit the mode of gen-
erally applicable laws, so Smith invited doubt about the ministerial excep-
tion. 
Third, building on this broad understanding of Smith, the United 
States had argued Hosanna-Tabor on the explicit premise that federal 
constitutional law did not support a general ministerial exception from 
civil rights laws.
16
 The government argued that Smith’s reference to “con-
troversies over religious authority” did not extend to application of the 
civil rights laws to a religious employer.
17
 In accord with the view of some 
of the Re-Rationalizers, discussed below, the United States contended 
that the constitutional immunity for religious employers was coextensive 
with and bounded by the freedom of expressive association, held by secu-
lar and religious employers alike.
18
 Thus, a unanimous opinion in sup-
port of a ministerial exception would require every Justice to reject the 
 
12
In EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the D.C. Circuit 
directly confronted the question of whether Smith had undermined the ministerial 
exception, and concluded that it had not. Id. at 461–63 (analyzing the ministerial 
exception as a “hybrid right” that survives Smith and involves both Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clause considerations). 
13
460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972). 
14
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), a decision 
concerning the dismissal of a high-ranking official of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox 
Diocese in North America, might have invoked the exception, but it was at that time a 
very recent doctrinal label in the federal courts. 
15
494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (characterizing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 696, 
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 
(1969), and Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94 
(1952) as involving “controversies over religious authority or dogma”). 
16
See Brief for Respondent at 19–29, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (No. 10-533), 2011 WL 3319555. 
17
Id. at 22–26. 
18
Id. at 29–32. 
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view of the United States that religious employers deserved no constitu-
tionally distinctive treatment. 
Fourth, the facts of Hosanna-Tabor were significantly suboptimal from 
the employer’s perspective. Cheryl Perich, the employee whose termina-
tion was at issue, was a “called” elementary school teacher,
19
 but she was 
not an ordained pastor who led Sabbath worship services or had the au-
thority to administer sacraments. Religious teaching was a regular but 
quantitatively quite limited part of her job. Although Perich’s complaint 
to the EEOC asserted that she was being discriminated against on 
grounds of disability,
20
 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
School (“Hosanna-Tabor”) ultimately dismissed her in retaliation for 
making a complaint to a government agency.
21
 The EEOC’s case thus 
rested on the prohibition on retaliation against employees who complain 
of forbidden discrimination, even if their own complaint of discrimina-
tion turns out to be nonmeritorious, as Perich’s disability claim eventual-
ly did. 
Professor Laycock’s prospective assessment that, from Hosanna-
Tabor’s perspective, “the case had some good facts and some bad facts,”
22
 
thus seems entirely reasonable. Good and bad in this context reflect 
nothing more than the likelihood of persuading Justices to one’s side. 
Cases with a rich mix of good-and-bad facts do not usually present a sub-
stantial likelihood of a unanimous opinion, especially in a legal context 
in which fact-bound analyses are commonplace. On this set of facts, the 
Sixth Circuit had concluded that Perich was not a “ministerial” employee, 
because her religious duties were not the primary focus of her job, quan-
titatively significant, or any different from religious duties assigned to lay 
teachers in the school.
23
 This result in the Sixth Circuit, and the mixture 
of facts that produced it, considerably diminished the probability of a 
unanimous decision, especially one in favor of her employer. 
Fifth, the most likely reservation or concern in the Supreme Court 
about the ministerial exception was the gender-based impact of such a 
rule. The case itself involved a female employee. Although not all minis-
terial exception cases involve female employees and assertions of gender 
 
19
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191 (explaining the training and commitment 
required to be a “called” teacher). 
20
Id. at 179. 
21
Id. at 180. 
22
Laycock, supra note 1, at 840. See also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Narrative 
Pluralism and Doctrinal Incoherence in Hosanna-Tabor, 64 Mercer L. Rev. 405, 408–13 
(2013) [hereinafter Gedicks, Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal Incoherence] (analyzing 
facts closely and concluding that they show “the ministerial exception deployed as a 
pretextual smokescreen to hide classic disability discrimination and retaliation 
prohibited by the ADA”). 
23
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 
779–80 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
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discrimination, a substantial number do involve that constellation of par-
ty and claim. Unsurprisingly, therefore, most of the academic criticism of 
the ministerial exception came from feminist scholars,
24
 who were con-
cerned about sexism, both overt and covert, in the ministry of many dif-
ferent faiths. This concern seemed so prominently presented in this par-
ticular litigation,
25
 and in ministerial exception decisions more generally, 
that commentators assumed that Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and So-
tomayor would be influenced by it.
26
 
Finally, the questions raised in Hosanna-Tabor presented an especially 
ripe opportunity for disagreement among the Justices about the scope of 
Employment Division v. Smith. Only two Justices who were on the Court in 
1990 remained in 2012. Justice Scalia authored Smith, and Justice Kenne-
dy joined that opinion. Three years later, Kennedy (joined by, among 
others, Justices Scalia and Thomas) authored the opinion in Lukumi,
27
 
which explicitly reaffirmed that Smith had been correctly decided. Ken-
nedy also authored the Smith-affirming opinion in City of Boerne;
28
 Justices 
Thomas and Scalia once again joined Kennedy, as did Justice Ginsburg. 
So the Hosanna-Tabor Court included four Justices who had expressed 
open support for the correctness of Smith. 
We cannot say the same of the other five, however. In City of Boerne, 
Justice Breyer joined Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion,
29
 which as-
serted the incorrectness of Smith as a reason for recognizing congression-
al power to override that decision.
30
 As of 2012, Chief Justice Roberts and 
 
24
See, e.g., Joanne C. Brant, Our Shield Belongs to the Lord: Religious Employers and a 
Constitutional Right to Discriminate, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 275 (1994); Caroline 
Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from 
Antidiscrimination Law, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1965 (2007); Leslie Griffin, Ordained 
Discrimination, The Case Against the Ministerial Exception (Univ. of Hous. Law Ctr., Paper 
No. 2011-A-9, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1936073; 
Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying 
Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 1049 (1966). 
25
See, e.g., Brief of NAACP Legal Defense Fund et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondent at 4–8, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 
565 U.S. 171 (2012) (No. 10-533), 2011 WL 3532699. 
26
One of the coauthors of this paper, Lupu, told a reporter at the time of oral 
argument that the only sure prediction in the case was that the opinion would not be 
for a unanimous Court, because it was unthinkable that all three female Justices 
would side with Hosanna-Tabor, and equally unthinkable that all six male Justices 
would side with the government. 
27
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 521 
(1993). 
28
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511, 519–21 (1997) (holding that 
Congress may not, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, impose on the states 
stricter religious liberty standards than the Free Exercise Clause requires). 
29
Id. at 544–65 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
30
Id. at 544–45. 
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Justice Sotomayor had offered no hints as to their views of Smith.
31
 Justice 
Alito had, while a Third Circuit judge, authored the well-known opinion 
in Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark,
32
 an opinion which suggested 
implicitly that Smith should be narrowly construed on the question of 
what constitutes a generally applicable law. Justice Kagan, while serving as 
White House Counsel in the 1990s, had strenuously criticized a state 
court’s narrow reading of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
33
 This 
suggests at least a possibility that she thought Smith wrongly decided, and 
wanted RFRA to fill the gap in religious liberty that Smith supposedly cre-
ated. 
Accordingly, we can say with a fair degree of confidence that four 
Justices believed Smith was correct, but that the other five had views that 
ranged from “Smith is wrong” to some softer yet still critical view of Smith’s 
approach to free exercise. Of course, the relevant question with respect 
to Hosanna-Tabor is the nexus between Smith and the ministerial excep-
tion. If, as we suggest later in this paper, Smith is utterly irrelevant to the 
questions posed by the ministerial exception, disagreement about Smith 
posed no threat to the possibility of unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor. But 
Smith seemed so central to the story of free exercise jurisprudence over 
the last 25 years that few would have expected all nine Justices to con-
clude that the Free Exercise Clause insulates religious entities from anti-
discrimination suits by employees with ministerial duties. 
II. THE KEY FEATURES OF THE UNANIMOUS OPINION IN 
HOSANNA-TABOR 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the full Court in Hosanna-Tabor 
has been the subject of elaborate commentary,
34
 and we will not burden 
the reader with repetition of the opinion’s every detail. Certain aspects of 
 
31
As noted in Professor Oleske’s article in this Symposium, the Chief Justice’s 
dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625–26 (2015), hints at dissatisfaction 
with Smith. See James Oleske, Jr., A Regrettable Invitation to “Constitutional Resistance,” 
Renewed Confusion over Religious Exemptions, and the Future of Free Exercise, 20 Lewis & 
Clark L. Rev. 1317 (2017).  
32
170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999). In his recent dissent from denial of certiorari in 
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, Justice Alito renewed his concern with the status of religious 
freedom in federal constitutional law, but the focus of his dissent is on what Alito 
describes as the religious targeting in the Washington regulation of pharmacies, and 
not on the correctness of Smith. 794 F.3d 1064 (9th
 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
2433, 2434 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting).  
33
The story is well told in Melissa Rogers, Free Exercise Flip? Kagan, Stevens, and the 
Future of Religious Freedom, Governance Stud. Brookings (June 23, 2010), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/06/23-kagan-rogers (interpreting 
a memorandum prepared by then White House Counsel Kagan to suggest “that, in an 
appropriate case, Kagan would favor revisiting and revising the Smith decision”).  
34
We cite much of this commentary in Part IV, infra. 
20_4_Lupu Tuttle_Article_7 (Do Not Delete) 1/25/2017  12:58 PM 
2017] THE MYSTERY OF UNANIMITY 1273 
it, however, have either gone undernoticed, or have been framed in ways 
that obscure rather than inform full comprehension of what it signifies. 
This Section focuses primarily on those parts of the opinion, with an eye 
to teasing out its distinctive moves and contributions. 
The role of history. The analytic portion of the opinion begins with a 
brief march through English and American colonial history, focused on 
controversies over the power of government to appoint clergy.
35
 One 
might expect that a survey of historically relevant practices, forming the 
“background [against which] the First Amendment was adopted”
36
 would 
be a commonplace in religion clause opinions, but it most certainly is 
not. 
The most famous account of that backdrop occurred in 1947 in Ever-
son,
37
 where every Justice—despite a 5–4 split on the merits—signed on to 
a narrative that places the history of disestablishment in Virginia, includ-
ing the crucial role in that history of Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance 
Against Religious Assessments, at the center of the First Amendment’s Reli-
gion Clauses.
38
 Justice Black, the author of Everson, later repeated a ver-
sion of that history in Engel v. Vitale,
39
 the Court’s first and nearly unani-
mous school-prayer decision. The historical account in Engel, 
unsurprisingly, emphasized the prominence of state-sponsored and 
mandated prayer that was a hallmark of the British establishment at the 
time of the framing of our First Amendment.
40
 The most focused re-
sponse to the Everson-Engel account in the Court’s subsequent decisions 
emerged in a powerful dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree,
41
 in which Justice 
Rehnquist argued against the so-called “separationist” model and in favor 
of a “no sect preference” model of nonestablishment. The latter moves 
away from the Virginia experience, and the background of Anglicanism 
in Great Britain and colonial America, and emphasizes the variety of in-
stitutional arrangements among the states in church-state relations at the 
time of the framing. 
The normative significance of the gap between these historical ac-
counts is considerable, and the two models accordingly lead to very dif-
ferent outcomes in cases about government funding of religious enti-
ties,
42
 government-sponsored worship,
43
 and government display of 
 
35
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 
182–85 (2012). 
36
Id. at 183. 
37
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
38
Compare id. at 8–13 with id. at 33–43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
39
370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
40
Id. at 425–36. 
41
472 U.S. 38, 91–113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
42
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
43
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
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religious symbols.
44
 Issues arising in all of those contexts have been very 
controversial and divisive within the Court for the past 40 years. Because 
there was no longer a consensus narrative, the Court had for decades 
gone relatively quiet on the relevance of American church-state history in 
the period leading up to the drafting of the First Amendment. 
Suddenly, in Hosanna-Tabor, the Justices completely agreed upon a 
history, because there indeed was a singular account relevant to the par-
ticular questions raised by the ministerial exception. The decision does 
not offer, however, a general history of church–state relations. Instead, it 
has a precise focus on a specific type of conflict. For separationists, ac-
commodationists, or members of any other relevant school of thought, 
the historical arguments all pointed in exactly the same direction. Gov-
ernment appointment of clergy was a hallmark of an oppressive state es-
tablishment; freedom of religious communities to choose their own lead-
ers is a sine qua non of the free exercise of religion.
45
 
The most relevant Religion Clause precedents. With this historical starting 
place fixed, the Hosanna-Tabor opinion quite logically moved to the ap-
propriate set of precedents. Notably, these did not include decisions 
about free exercise exemptions, such as Wisconsin v. Yoder,
46
 or decisions 
about government sponsorship of religion through funds, symbols, or 
worship. Rather, the Court found most relevant those decisions about the 
role of the state in disputes about church property, governance, and per-
sonnel. Ranging from the 1871 common law ruling in Watson v. Jones
47
 to 
the First Amendment-based decisions in Kedroff
48
 and Milivojevich,
49
 the 
central thread of this body of law is steady and unbroken—on matters of 
religious doctrine, church governance, and control of leadership, the 
state is forbidden from substituting its judgment for that of duly consti-
tuted religious authority. The state must respect the decisions of religious 
authorities on ecclesiastical questions.
50
 As Hosanna-Tabor goes on to say, 
 
44
See, e.g., McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. 
Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
45
For additional details of the relevant history, see Michael McConnell, 
Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 821, 827–32 (2012). Five 
states, at the time of their state disestablishments, adopted constitutional provisions 
that “religious societies have the exclusive right to choose their own ministers.” Id. at 
829 & n.47. As McConnell argues, this freedom is “part and parcel of 
disestablishment.” Id.; see also Brief Amici Curiae of Professor Eugene Volokh et al. in 
Support of Petitioner at 10–18, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. 
v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (No.10-533), 2011 WL 2470847. 
46
406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972). 
47
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1871). 
48
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 
94, 116 (1952). 
49
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 721 (1976). 
50
When decisions on legally disputed matters of property or personnel can be 
made without considering ecclesiastical questions, the Constitution is no bar to courts 
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the criteria for eligibility to ministry, and the fitness of any particular per-
son for ministry, are precisely such questions.
51
 
The roles of the respective Religion Clauses. In this series of earlier deci-
sions involving internal church disputes over property or personnel, a 
question often arose concerning which Religion Clause was doing the 
work. As Chief Justice Roberts noted in passing in Hosanna-Tabor, Kedroff 
makes a reference to the “free exercise of religion.”
52
 Viewed more 
broadly, however, the opinions show that the Court has frequently been 
content to rely on the “Religion Clauses” or “the First Amendment” more 
generally.
53
 This unspecified treatment of the distinctive roles of the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause in the judicial approach to 
these controversies had for years left commentators reaching for theories 
that would explain the Court’s frequent deference to the decisions of re-
ligious authorities.
54
 
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court’s longstanding reticence to assign a 
function to each Religion Clause vanished: 
By forbidding the “establishment of religion” and guaranteeing the 
“free exercise thereof,” the Religion Clauses ensured that the new 
Federal Government—unlike the English Crown—would have no 
role in filling ecclesiastical offices. The Establishment Clause pre-
vents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Ex-
ercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of reli-
gious groups to select their own.
55
 
As this Article proceeds, we will have considerably more to say about 
the respective functions, and interactive operations, of the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Establishment Clause in the foundations of the ministeri-
al exception. But the opinion itself gives two powerful hints of the roles 
being played by each. 
 
or other state agents making them. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604–05 (1979) 
(holding that courts may apply state law principles to resolve property disputes 
between church factions, so long as applying these principles does not require 
decision of ecclesiastical matters); Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 140 
(1872) (holding that courts may apply secular principles of corporate law to decide 
who within a church has authority to appoint trustees). 
51
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 
188–90 (2012). 
52
Id. at 186 (citing Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116). 
53
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710; Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull 
Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). 
54
See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over 
Religious Property, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1843 (1998). 
55
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184. Earlier in the opinion, the Chief Justice wrote 
that despite possible tension between the Religion Clauses in other contexts, there is 
no such tension here. “Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering 
with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.” Id. at 181. 
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First, although free exercise considerations shape the ministerial ex-
ception, the Court does not decide the case by balancing interests, in the 
model represented by Wisconsin v. Yoder,
56
 and eventually repudiated by 
Employment Division v. Smith.
57
 The Court’s distinction between the most 
important constitutional features of Hosanna-Tabor and Smith, both of 
which involve religious exemptions, is impossible to credit. “[A] church’s 
selection of its ministers,” the Court wrote, “is unlike an individual’s in-
gestion of peyote. Smith involved government regulation of only outward 
physical acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns government inter-
ference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mis-
sion of the church itself.”
58
 
As many others have noted, however, it is utterly unpersuasive to as-
sert that the peyote use involved in Smith is an outward act, while the 
treatment of Ms. Perich in Hosanna-Tabor is an “internal church deci-
sion,” thereby distinguishing the cases. Both decisions involve acts that 
reflect internal church activities, and both have actual or potential exter-
nal effects. 
We elaborate in Part IV about Hosanna-Tabor’s unsatisfying treatment 
of Smith, and the inferences drawn by other commentators from the in-
ternal tensions set up by this treatment. Here, we note only that the opin-
ion’s discussion of Smith is, in the context of the ministerial exception, a 
disavowal of the methodology of interest balancing associated with pre-
Smith free exercise adjudication.
59
 The Court’s final full paragraph in Ho-
sanna-Tabor eliminates any possibility of doubt about the rejection of that 
methodology in decisions about the scope of the ministerial exception: 
The interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimi-
nation statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest 
of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach 
their faith, and carry out their mission. When a minister who has 
been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was dis-
criminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us. 
The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its 
way.
60
 
The idea that “the First Amendment has struck the balance for us,” 
as distinguished from case-by-case judicial balancing of competing inter-
ests, is not only a rejection of now-abandoned Free Exercise methodolo-
gy. It also represents an affirmative embrace of long-standing Establish-
 
56
406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
57
494 U.S. 872, 884–85 (1990). 
58
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190. 
59
See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). That 
methodology is now the centerpiece of the Religion Freedom Restoration Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (2012). 
60
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196. 
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ment Clause methodology, in which decisions are definitional and dis-
positive. Once a practice, such as school sponsored prayer
61
 or direct 
government funding of the construction of space for worship,
62
 is judi-
cially determined to be an establishment of religion, the case is over. 
Competing government interests play no part. In its distinction of Smith 
and its rejection of interest balancing, Hosanna-Tabor sent a signal of pro-
found importance about the respective role of each of the Religion 
Clauses and the methodology of Religion Clause adjudication appropri-
ate to this case. 
We are fully mindful that the Hosanna-Tabor opinion gives equal 
weight to the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. In ad-
dition to mentioning both Clauses, the Court remarks that “the text of 
the First Amendment . . . gives special solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations.”
63
 That language—though oddly connected to the text, 
which says nothing about religious organizations—seems firmly anchored 
in a rights-based conception of the free exercise of religion. As we will 
develop further in Part III, however, the Clauses converge on the propo-
sition, both structural and rights-reinforcing, that the state may not de-
cide “purely ecclesiastical questions.” In embracing both Religion Claus-
es, rejecting interest balancing, and distinguishing Smith, what Hosanna-
Tabor disclaims is a sweeping theory of church autonomy that inevitably 
 
61
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schemmp, 
374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962). 
62
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973) 
(holding that the state may not finance cost of chapel reconstruction in religious 
school); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (finding that United States 
may not finance cost of an academic building that may someday be available for 
worship or religious instruction). 
63
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 189. The context for this remark is the repudiation 
of the government’s argument that religious organizations have no greater right than 
secular entities to be free from government interference in selecting leaders. In 
response to that argument, the Chief Justice wrote: “That result is hard to square with 
the text of the First Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of 
religious organizations. We cannot accept the remarkable view that the Religion 
Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization’s freedom to select its own 
ministers.” Id. Although “the text of the First Amendment” makes no mention 
whatsoever of “religious organizations,” the Religion Clauses do express special 
constitutional concern about religion (non-establishment), and special constitutional 
respect for religion’s free exercise. The opinion’s very next sentence does no more 
than reinforce the rest of the opinion by suggesting that “the Religion Clauses have 
[something] to say about a religious organization’s freedom to select its own 
ministers.” Id. Indeed, they do, for the reasons we advance in this paper, rather than 
because religious organizations are entitled to “special solicitude” even in the absence 
of ecclesiastical questions. See Part IV.A., infra. 
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would require the weighing of burdens on religious exercise against op-
posing state interests.
64
 
The judicial role in administering the ministerial exception. The method-
ology deployed in Hosanna-Tabor, whatever its particular nexus with ei-
ther Religion Clause, pervades and illuminates all of the other crucial 
sections of the opinion. The ministerial exception is about definition and 
scope, rather than any general weighing of church interests against com-
peting concerns of government. 
With respect to the questions of which employees and what causes of 
action are covered by the exception, the Hosanna-Tabor opinion makes a 
number of distinctive and revealing moves. All of them reinforce the no-
tion that the ministerial exception is driven—precisely as the citations to 
Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojevich suggest—by the long-standing doctrine of 
judicial abstention from deciding purely ecclesiastical questions. 
With respect to which employees fall under the exception, the Court 
engages in a careful and independent appraisal of Ms. Perich’s employ-
ment role. Focusing in considerable detail on her title, training, self-
understanding as a minister, and specific duties, the Court concluded 
that she “performed an important role in transmitting the Lutheran faith 
to the next generation.”
65
 
This question of role is functional, not ecclesiastical. Were the ques-
tion of ministerial status ecclesiastical, employers would be free to answer 
it unilaterally, in a wholly self-interested way. Nothing could stop a house 
of worship from asserting that all its employees, from priest to custodian, 
transmit the faith by serving as role models. The emphasis in Hosanna-
Tabor on training, title, and, most importantly, on particularized tasks—
teaching, leading others in worship, and otherwise communicating the 
faith through words—means that courts must decide, based on evidence, 
whether the ministerial exception applies to a specific position.
66
 
Retention of judicial control over the factual predicates of the minis-
terial exception, case by case, fully illuminates the opinion’s already fa-
mous footnote four,
67
 in which the Court asserts that the ministerial ex-
 
64
We thus disagree with Professor Gedicks’s assessment that Hosanna-Tabor is 
incoherent in its simultaneous embrace of the structural norms of the Establishment 
Clause and the rights-based norms associated with the Free Exercise Clause. See 
Gedicks, Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal Incoherence, supra note 22, at 421–33. 
Hosanna-Tabor rests on both Clauses, but reaffirms Smith in rejecting the interest-
balancing methodology once associated with the Free Exercise Clause and now 
embodied in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 
65
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192. 
66
Id. at 191–94. Only Justice Thomas would defer to the characterization of the 
religious community with respect to who counts as a minister. Id. at 710–11 (Thomas, 
J., concurring). 
67
Id. at 195 n.4. See generally Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote Four: Church 
Autonomy as Arbitration, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1891 (2013). 
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ception “operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable 
claim, not a jurisdictional bar.”
68
 If the exception arose simply from the 
status of the defendant as a religious entity, coupled with a unilateral as-
sertion that the plaintiff is a ministerial employee, those features in con-
junction would deprive the court of “power to hear the case,”
69
 as the 
Court puts it. 
Viewed as an affirmative defense, however, the exception requires 
more than a defendant’s status as a religious entity and its assertions of 
the employee’s role. Whether the employee is actually engaged in “minis-
ter[ing] to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical’”
70
—may involve 
disputed questions of fact. The plaintiff-employee is entitled to contest 
the characterization of her role as ministerial by offering proof of facts 
that would show that she does not engage in ministry. Accordingly, con-
tested assertions that a case is governed by the ministerial exception must 
be resolved through a separate motion for summary judgment, or a sepa-
rate evidentiary hearing with the opportunity for both sides to present 
evidence of the employee’s role.
71
 
Moreover, if the court determines that the plaintiff and the claim she 
presents are covered by the ministerial exception, the reasons for the de-
fendant’s actions become irrelevant. In responding to the government’s 
argument that Hosanna-Tabor’s asserted reason for firing Perich—“that 
she violated the Synod’s commitment to internal dispute resolution”—
was pretextual,
72
 the Court responds bluntly: 
That suggestion misses the point of the ministerial exception. The 
purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to 
fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The ex-
ception instead ensures that the authority to select and control who 
will minister to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical’ . . .—is 
the church’s alone.
73
 
If the court determines that the employee is not a minister for pur-
poses of the exception, the case may proceed to the merits.
74
 Moreover, 
even if the case involves a ministerial employee, some claims may still not 
be barred. The Court explicitly recognizes this possibility in the Hosanna-
Tabor opinion: 
 
68
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4. 
69
Id. (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010)). 
70
Id. at 195 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)). 
71
See Part III, infra, for further discussion of the connection between Hosanna-
Tabor’s footnote four and an Establishment Clause-based theory of adjudicative 
disability.  
72
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194. 
73
Id. at 194–95 (citing Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 119). 
74
See pp. 1285–86, infra, for discussion of why interlocutory appellate review 
should be allowed for a denial of the ministerial exception.  
20_4_Lupu Tuttle_Article_7 (Do Not Delete) 1/25/2017  12:58 PM 
1280 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:4 
The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought 
on behalf of a minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire 
her. Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such a 
suit. We express no view on whether the exception bars other types 
of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract 
or tortious conduct by their religious employers.
75
 
In Part III below, we analyze the kinds of claims that courts have cor-
rectly held are not covered by the ministerial exception. For now, it is 
enough to observe that Hosanna-Tabor, by its own terms, does not repre-
sent any sweeping proclamation of the immunity of religious entities 
from liability to their employees, ministerial or otherwise, or to members 
of their religious community. Its rationale is limited to questions con-
cerning the fitness of a particular person for ministry on behalf of her 
employer. These are ecclesiastical questions, and the Constitution puts 
them off limits to the state, including its courts. That, and nothing more 
or less, is the content of the unanimous ruling in Hosanna-Tabor Evangeli-
cal Lutheran School & Church v. EEOC. 
III. A DEFENSE AND ELABORATION OF HOSANNA-TABOR 
Hosanna-Tabor bars government agencies from adjudicating specific 
types of disputes between religious institutions and those who teach, 
preach, or otherwise guide the faithful. As the opinion reveals, that limi-
tation on government power draws primarily on Establishment Clause 
methodology of carving out areas of forbidden government action, like 
officially sponsored prayer in public school, rather than a free exercise 
approach of weighing burdens on religion against competing state inter-
ests. 
The strong Establishment Clause foundations of Hosanna-Tabor are 
substantive, as well as methodological. Accordingly, Hosanna-Tabor lines 
up quite closely with the central ideas in our prior work. In Secular Gov-
ernment, Religious People,
76
 we articulate a theory of the Religion Clauses 
that emphasizes the long-standing constitutional commitment to sharply 
delimit the state’s involvement with religion and religious institutions. 
The jurisdiction of government in the United States, at all levels, may not 
encompass efforts to control or shape the people’s religious character. 
However controversial this theory may be with respect to government’s 
acknowledgment of theological sentiments,
77
 celebration of religious hol-
 
75
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196. 
76
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Secular Government, Religious People 
30–33 (2014); see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious 
Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 37, 38–39 (2002). 
77
The Court has been deeply divided in such cases. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary 
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idays,
78
 or financial support of religious institutions,
79
 the unanimity in 
Hosanna-Tabor shows the rock-solid qualities of the jurisdictional view 
when the context is selection of clergy and religious teachers. 
We make no claims to novelty in our constitutional narrative of the 
relationship between the state and the people’s religious character. The 
basic features of that narrative predate the First Amendment, and con-
tinue in the law right up to the present moment. It is beyond dispute that 
the Establishment Clause takes much of its meaning from the founding 
generation’s experience with established churches, in both Great Britain 
and the colonies.
80
 Government officials in Great Britain regularly exer-
cised the power to decide ecclesiastical questions. They did so by defining 
the beliefs to which all clergy must conform, directly controlling the ap-
pointment of the most senior clerics, and expelling from ministry those 
who failed to carry out government-prescribed modes of worship.
81
 Some 
British colonies in North America maintained similar control over cler-
gy.
82
 
In the American colonies, two movements—one religious and the 
other political—ultimately destroyed that British tradition of government 
power over the instruments of faith. In religious terms, beginning in the 
mid-18th century, evangelists of the First Great Awakening denied the au-
thority of state-selected ministers, and asserted that the blessing of the 
Holy Spirit provides the sole basis of any minister’s calling.
83
 In political 
terms, the American Revolution provided a sharp break from Anglican 
tradition of state control over clergy.
84
 By the late 18th century, state offi-
cials played virtually no role in the selection of ministers, even in those 
jurisdictions that maintained state financial support for churches.
85
 
Whatever else belonged to the original sphere of American disestablish-
ment, the exclusion of state control over employment of clergy soon be-
came an unchallenged and universal element. 
 
Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005). For discussion, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra 
note 76, at 141–74. 
78
See Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 615 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 676 (1984).  
79
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002); Mitchell v. 
Helms, 530 U.S. 791 (2000). For discussion of the funding decisions, see Lupu & 
Tuttle, supra note 76, at 74–112.  
80
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 76, at 8–9. 
81
Id.  
82
Id. at 9. 
83
James H. Hutson, Church and State in America: The First Two Centuries 
78–84 (2008); Mark Noll, The Rise of Evangelicalism: The Age of Edwards, 
Whitefield, and the Wesleys 129–30, 147–48, 179–83 (2003). 
84
See generally Patricia U. Bonomi, Under the Cope of Heaven: Religion, 
Society, and Politics in Colonial America 187–216 (updated ed. 2003). 
85
McConnell, supra note 45, at 828. 
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In disputes that involve the choice of clergy and other religious ques-
tions, these religious and political developments have generated a dis-
tinctive American legal tradition. Beginning with its very first engage-
ment with this type of problem, the Supreme Court has consistently held 
that government may not resolve “strictly and purely ecclesiastical” ques-
tions.
86
 This idea of limited judicial competence is an attribute of dises-
tablishment, although, as Hosanna-Tabor appropriately recognizes, this 
constraint simultaneously promotes the free exercise of religion. By re-
moving the power of the state to resolve ecclesiastical questions, the Con-
stitution maximizes space for religious communities to decide for them-
selves crucial issues of governance, doctrine, and the identity of those 
who will articulate that doctrine.
87
 
To appreciate fully how the ministerial exception implicates ecclesi-
astical questions, one must unpack the components of the exception and 
understand their interrelatedness. First and foremost, the exception 
forecloses judicial inquiry into the criteria that religious communities use 
to measure eligibility for positions involving communication of the faith. 
For some traditional communities, these criteria include sex, but they 
might also include marital status, sexual orientation, age, education, ex-
perience, ancestry, or even race. Contrary to the expectations of those 
untutored in this field of law, very few ministerial exception cases in the 
courts involve direct challenges to overt and otherwise unlawful criteria 
for employment. 
The typical case in which the ministerial exception is claimed in-
volves religious communities that raise the exception as a defense when a 
member of their clergy accuses them of discrimination that is both gen-
erally unlawful and a violation of the community’s own publicly pro-
nounced norms. In such a case, the ecclesiastical question is not one of 
general eligibility for ministry, but rather of the fitness of a particular 
person for ministry. 
 
86
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1871). 
87
Even apart from disputes over the control of property or the appointment of 
ministers, the Establishment Clause facilitates religious freedom by removing the 
state from distinctively religious activities. It leaves the control and performance of 
those activities to private individuals and communities. For example, in Engel v. Vitale, 
370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962), the Court held that the Establishment Clause bars state 
officials from authoring prayers for use in public schools. Responding to those who 
asserted that a ban on school-sponsored prayer was hostile to religion, Justice Black, 
writing for the Court, said: “It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each 
separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or 
sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people 
themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance.” Id. at 
435. Engel thus promotes religious freedom, but it does not do so by creating 
exemptions or opt-out rights for objectors, religious or otherwise. Instead, it 
promotes free exercise values by delineating the respective domains of government 
and religion. 
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Indeed, this is an apt description of the case of Cheryl Perich, whom 
Hosanna-Tabor dismissed for complaining to a government agency of 
what she viewed as discrimination based on disability.
88
 Whether or not 
this reason for dismissal qualifies as religious,
89
 Ms. Perich’s formal com-
plaint to the EEOC disqualified her from ministry at Hosanna-Tabor, and 
that particularized and personal disqualification represented an ecclesi-
astical determination. 
In many ministerial exception cases, the employee asserts that the 
adverse job action was made on a legally forbidden ground. In response, 
the employer generally offers a different and valid reason for the action. 
In cases of this character, some scholars (grouped below as the “Dissent-
ers”) have argued strenuously that courts should adjudicate the true rea-
son for the adverse job action.
90
 These critics believe that if courts find 
that the true reason is legally discriminatory, and that the asserted reason 
is nothing more than a pretext for that discrimination, courts should not 
apply the ministerial exemption. 
Hosanna-Tabor rightly rejects that position. Once the court finds that 
the plaintiff occupies a ministerial position, and that the substance of the 
claim is covered by the exception, the case must end. In such cases, rec-
ognizing the ministerial exception serves the prophylactic function of ful-
ly recognizing the adjudicative disability of courts with respect to fitness 
for ministry, and thereby protecting religious communities from both in-
appropriate intrusion and the risk of erroneous determinations. Suppose 
such pretext inquiries were allowed. Judges and juries would hear evi-
dence with respect to the plaintiff’s performance of her clerical responsi-
bilities, as well as evidence that performance criteria were being applied 
in a discriminatory way. As we wrote in a piece published several years 
prior to Hosanna-Tabor,
91
 in light of a detailed analysis of the pretext 
problem: 
Courts cannot decide whether a congregation has engaged in dis-
criminatory conduct toward a ministerial employee without first de-
termining a set of qualifications for holding the role, or a standard 
of performance within the role, and then measuring the employee’s 
 
88
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 
179 (2012).  
89
Hosanna-Tabor asserted that Perich violated religious norms about 
appropriate mechanisms for dispute resolution, but the Court’s opinion explicitly 
says the reason for dismissal need not be religious. Id. at 194 (“The purpose of the 
exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is 
made for a religious reason.”). 
90
See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 24, at 2015–22; see also Gedicks, Narrative Pluralism 
and Doctrinal Incoherence, supra note 22, at 426–27. 
91
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10. 
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conduct . . . against these standards. Such acts of measurement are 
beyond the state’s adjudicative competence.
92
 
If civil courts were free to invalidate decisions made by religious au-
thorities under these circumstances, the courts would be substituting the 
judgment of the state for that of the religious community with respect to 
the role and content of ministry. Even if that constitutional vice were 
avoidable, courts could not warrant that pretext adjudication would pro-
ceed with perfect accuracy. The inevitability of mistake means that, in an 
unknowable fraction of cases, the state would be imposing unjustifiable 
pressure on religious entities to refrain from an adverse job action. That 
pressure is less troublesome than a wholly external appointment by the 
government of a minister, but it necessarily coerces a religious communi-
ty to retain a minister it no longer wants.
93
 
Within its boundaries concerning which employees are covered and 
the kinds of claims that are encompassed, the ministerial exception is 
fortress-like.
94
 Just like other nonestablishment limitations, it cannot be 
defeated by competing considerations of legal policy. That the exception 
is grounded, at least in part, in the Establishment Clause means that cases 
that fall under the exception involve the government’s constitutional dis-
ability to adjudicate, producing a corresponding defendant’s immunity 
from adjudication.
95
 In the operation of the ministerial exception, the 
impermissibility of pretext adjudication thus reveals once again the per-
fect convergence of Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause con-
siderations. 
Because the exception is impenetrable within its boundaries, it is 
crucial that courts, not religious institutions, retain full authority to draw 
 
92
Id. at 144 (analogizing the issues to those presented by claims for clergy 
malpractice). 
93
For this reason, even advocates of pretext adjudication concede that the 
remedy of ordering a clergy member reinstated to her position is, at least in some 
circumstances, constitutionally inappropriate. See Corbin, supra note 24, at 2015–22. 
That concession is a recognition of the constitutional distinctiveness and sensitivity of 
this employer-employee relationship. The risk of damage awards is a weaker form of 
compulsion, but nevertheless exerts pressure to retain an unwanted minister, and 
may well prevent the congregation from hiring a replacement minister. Thus, even in 
the context of pretext claims, a nonestablishment concern produces free exercise 
payoffs. 
94
Marc DeGirolami, Free Exercise by Moonlight, 53 San Diego L. Rev. 105, 127–29 
(2016) (making a similar point about the strength of the exception within its 
boundaries, although he does not connect the point to the exception’s Establishment 
Clause provenance). 
95
As we explain in Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10, at 122 n.20, these terms build 
on a Hohfeldian conception of legal rights. See also Frederick M. Gedicks, The 
Religious Question Doctrine: Free-Exercise Right or Anti-Establishment Immunity? (Robert 
Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Studies, Working Paper No. 2016/10, 2016), http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2746593. 
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those boundaries. Hosanna-Tabor embraces that allocation of power.
96
 By 
locating in civil courts the authority to determine the applicability of the 
exception, the doctrine ensures that defendants do not get to be judges 
in their own cause. 
Once the ministerial exception is understood in this way, it follows 
that the procedure used in litigating whether an employee plaintiff is 
covered by the exception has constitutional dimensions. The affirmative 
defense of “ministerial exception” should not simply be thrown into the 
mix of claims and defenses present in a particular case. Instead, courts 
should employ a carefully constructed procedure, designed to determine 
1) whether the employee’s position is ministerial, and 2) whether the 
claim implicates her ministerial character, before proceeding to general 
discovery. If these determinations are folded into broad-ranging discov-
ery procedures, much of the significance of the immunity will be lost. 
Discovery would raise questions about the plaintiff’s fitness for ministry, 
even though the trier of fact is constitutionally disabled from adjudicat-
ing that question. If the employee is a minister for purposes of the excep-
tion, any part of the case that raises the question of fitness for that minis-
try must end.
97
 
For the same reasons, interlocutory appellate review should be al-
lowed for a denial of the ministerial exception by a court of first impres-
sion; otherwise, the case’s full merits may be unconstitutionally adjudi-
cated, and the defendant’s procedural immunity from that adjudication 
breached, by an erroneous decision that the ministerial exception does 
not apply.
98
 Furthermore, the Establishment Clause provenance of the 
ministerial exception means that courts remain obliged to inquire, sua 
sponte, into the applicability of the ministerial exception, even if the de-
fendant does not raise the question.
99
 As the Sixth Circuit recently held 
 
96
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 
190–95 (2012). Courts may not decide ecclesiastical questions, but they must decide 
whether a particular position involves transmission of the faith. That is a functional 
question, not a religious one. 
97
In this respect, we disagree with the result in Temple Emanuel of Newton v. Mass. 
Comm’n Against Discrimination, 975 N.E.2d 433, 441 (Mass. 2012), which held that the 
Commission could proceed to the merits of a discrimination claim without awaiting 
final judicial resolution of a ministerial exception defense. Administrative 
convenience does not trump constitutional disability. 
98
The context is thus somewhat analogous to cases involving claims of the 
immunity of government officers from individual damage awards for violation of 
federal law; in such cases, claims of qualified immunity are raised and resolved in 
advance of the merits, and denials of immunity are subject to interlocutory review. See 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–30 (1985). 
99
EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461–63 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(describing ministerial exception as a hybrid of Establishment Clause and Free 
Exercise Clause considerations); id. at 459 (approving action of the district court 
judge in raising sua sponte the question of whether a position as professor of canon 
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in the precise context of the ministerial exception, the parties do not 
have power to waive the constitutional disabilities of the courts.
100
 
Even with respect to employees with ministerial responsibilities, not 
all claims against their institutional employers should fall within the ad-
judicative disability created by the ministerial exception. The disability is 
issue-based, not party-based, so it remains open in each case to ask 
whether some or all of the relevant issues are constitutionally foreclosed. 
The Hosanna-Tabor opinion explicitly recognized the necessity of such an 
inquiry when it flagged the possibility that the ministerial exception 
might not bar various tort and contract claims by clergy against their em-
ployers.
101
 “There will be time enough,” the Court wrote, “to address the 
applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and when they 
arise.”
102
 
Such circumstances have arisen in the courts prior to Hosanna-Tabor, 
and they continue to arise in that decision’s wake. As we analyzed this set 
of questions in elaborate detail in 2009,
103
 the pattern of decisions in the 
lower courts matched tightly with our appraisal that the exception is en-
tirely issue-based, rather than driven solely by the character of the parties. 
For a prominent example, courts have systematically rejected claims of 
clergy malpractice on the grounds that the standard of care for counsel-
ing by clergy would inevitably encompass ecclesiastical questions about 
the minister-congregant relationship.
104
 In contrast, many courts have 
permitted claims by victims of sexual abuse against religious organiza-
tions for negligent supervision of offending clergy.
105
 In such cases, the 
relevant legal questions pertain to decisions about exposing potential vic-
 
law is covered by the ministerial exception); see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 76, at 
38 (“[A]s is true of other questions of constitutional structure, judges must be 
mindful that constitutional allocations of power may not be altered by agreement of 
the parties involved—neither the state, nor any religious believers, may consent to a 
swap of constitutionally separated functions.”). 
100
Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship, 777 F.3d 829, 836 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(“The ministerial exception is a structural limitation imposed on government by the 
Religion Clauses, a limitation that can never be waived.”). For a comprehensive 
account of the relationship between the ministerial exception and the prohibition on 
judicial resolution of ecclesiastical questions, see Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 
442 F.3d 1036, 1037–40 (7th Cir. 2006). Judge Posner’s opinion in Tomic rests on 
Article III, id. at 1037–38, as well as the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, id. at 
1039, 1042. 
101
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (“We express no view on whether the 
exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of 
contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.”).  
102
Id. 
103
See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10. 
104
Id. at 142–43; see infra note 136. 
105
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 
2004 BYU L. Rev. 1789, 1851–56, 1851 n.243 (2004) (citing and discussing decisions 
that allow claims of negligent supervision to go forward). 
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tims to known or foreseeable risks of physical and dignitary harm, not to 
decisions about whether a particular person is fit for ministry. Whether to 
revoke a person’s status as a minister is exclusively the church’s business; 
keeping predators away from children and other potential victims is ap-
propriately a matter for the State’s concern, as well as that of responsible 
religious communities.
106
 
The clergy malpractice cases and the sexual abuse cases are suits by 
third parties, not suits by clergy themselves. But the relevant principles of 
disability and immunity apply with equal force in suits brought by clergy 
against present or former employers. The best example of when ministe-
rial exception principles do not preclude adjudication involves claims of 
sexual harassment by clergy against their supervisors and employers.
107
 
Adjudication of the cause of action, despite its grounding in statutory 
prohibition of sex discrimination, does not necessarily require any deci-
sion about the plaintiff’s fitness for ministry.
108
 Courts may need to sepa-
rate claims of wrongful termination from those of sexual harassment, but 
the ministerial exception does not bar the harassment claim.
109
 Moreover, 
just as one would expect from the premises of our theory, courts have 
been willing to resolve claims by ministers of breach of contract by their 
employers,
110
 but only to the extent that the questions of breach do not 
involve evaluation of ministerial performance or other ecclesiastical ques-
tions.
111
 
Did the Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor alter this pattern of results 
and reasoning? Following research methods we have employed in this as 
well as other contexts,
112
 we have examined every reported decision, state 
and federal, that cites Hosanna-Tabor between the time of decision in 
January 2012 and the middle of 2016. The results emphatically support 
our reading of Hosanna-Tabor. 
The most predictable decisions are those in which an employee with 
indisputably ministerial duties litigates a claim involving a direct deter-
mination of fitness for the ministerial post. Whether the cause of action 
involved claims of discrimination,
113
 or attempts to review dismissals as ei-
 
106
Id. at 1846 & nn.224–28 (citing and discussing decisions forbidding claims of 
negligent ordination). 
107
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10, at 160–63, 160 n.218. 
108
Even in sexual harassment cases, the exception bars the remedy of 
reinstatement. Bollard v. Ca. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 950 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
109
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10, at 160–63.  
110
Id. at 144–46. 
111
Id. at 146 & nn.151–52.  
112
See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 105. 
113
Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship, 777 F.3d 829, 834 (6th Cir. 2015). 
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ther tortiously wrongful
114
 or lacking contractual “cause,”
115
 these cases 
fall squarely in the path of Hosanna-Tabor, and the claims are barred. 
As one would expect, a number of cases involve a dispute over appli-
cation of Hosanna-Tabor’s multi-factor test for who qualifies as a ministe-
rial employee. After close, fact-specific analysis, as required by Hosanna-
Tabor, of an employee’s particular roles and duties, courts have held that 
the exception covers a church music director;
116
 a principal of a Catholic 
high school;
117
 a drug counselor in a religious mission;
118
 an officer in a 
Methodist agency for interfaith dialogue;
119
 a nonordained teacher of 
Jewish studies in an afterschool educational program at a synagogue;
120
 
and a chaplain in a religiously affiliated hospital.
121
 And, after similarly 
close analysis, courts have excluded from the exception a facilities man-
ager at a synagogue;
122
 a variety of religious school employees, including a 
language arts teacher,
123
 a technology teacher,
124
 and a food services di-
rector;
125
 and, perhaps most strikingly, a professor of religious studies at a 
seminary, because his teaching duties did not include transmission of the 
faith.
126
 
 
114
Ginyard v. Church of God in Christ Ky. First Juris., Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 725, 727 
(W.D. Ky. 2014); Melhorn v. Balt. Wash. Conf. of United Methodist Church, No. 
2065, 2016 WL 1065884, at *1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 16, 2016); Greater Fairview 
Missionary Baptist Church v. Hollins, 2013-IA-01951-SCT (¶5) (Miss. 2015). 
115
Winbery v. La. Coll., 2013-339, pp. 2–3 (La. App. 3 Cir., Nov. 6, 2013), 124 
So.3d 1212, 1214; Simons v. Lewis, No. C-92-1, 2014 WL 4916616, at *2–4 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div., Oct. 2, 2014); Warnick v. All Saints Episcopal Church, 2011 No. 01539, 
2014 WL 11210513, at *1–5 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl., Apr. 15, 2014); Reese v. Gen. Assembly 
of Faith Presbyterian Church in Am., 425 S.W.3d 625, 626 (Tex. App. 2014); DeBruin 
v. St. Patrick Congregation, 2012 WI 94, ¶5, 343 Wis. 2d 83, 93, 816 N.W.2d 878, 883. 
116
Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d. 169, 180 (5th Cir. 2012). 
117
Fratello v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., No. 12-CV-7359, 2016 WL 
1249609, at *1 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 29, 2016).  
118
Rogers v. Salvation Army, No. 14-12656, 2015 WL 2186007, at *1 (E.D. Mich., 
May 11, 2015). 
119
Mills v. Standing Gen. Comm’n on Christian Unity, 986 N.Y.S.2d 60 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2014). 
120
Temple Emanuel of Newton v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 975 
N.E.2d 433, 443 (Mass. 2012). 
121
Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 158 F. Supp. 3d 177, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
122
Davis v. Balt. Hebrew Congregation, 985 F. Supp. 2d 701, 711 (D. Md. 2013). 
123
Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1177 
(N.D. Ind. 2014). 
124
Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 WL 1068165, at *5 
(S.D. Ohio, Mar. 29, 2012). 
125
Barrett v. Fontbonne Acad., No. NOCV2014-751, 2015 WL 9682042, at *11 
(Mass. Super. Ct., Dec. 16, 2015). 
126
Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 587, 596 (Ky. 2014). See 
generally Kevin Murphy, Administering the Ministerial Exception, Post Hosanna-Tabor: 
Why Contract Claims Should Not Be Barred, 28 Notre Dame. J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 
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Our view of Hosanna-Tabor is most starkly confirmed by a series of 
decisions in which the relevant concern is whether the case requires ad-
judication of strictly ecclesiastical questions. When it does, adjudication 
does not go forward, whether or not a ministerial employee is involved. 
And when the case does not involve decision of such a question, adjudica-
tion does go forward, even if a ministerial employee is involved. Put dif-
ferently, in cases that fall under the sweep of Hosanna-Tabor and the long 
line of decisions it extends, the presence of a ministerial employee is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient to bar adjudication. It is the presence of ec-
clesiastical questions, including fitness of a particular person for ministry, 
that produces a constitutional impediment to adjudication. It is hard to 
imagine positive law evidence more corroborative of our theory than this. 
In perfect accord with the constitutional narrative we espouse, sever-
al decisions bar adjudication of claims against religious communities en-
tirely because of the ecclesiastical questions involved, whether or not the 
party raising them has ministerial status. In Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyter-
ian Church,
127
 for example, the Washington State Supreme Court refused 
to adjudicate the lawfulness of a dismissal of an employee who com-
plained about potential misuse of funds by a senior pastor. Without de-
ciding whether the plaintiff was a ministerial employee,
128
 the Court con-
cluded that the claim involved ecclesiastical questions of internal church 
adjudication and governance. And in Weiter v. Kurtz,
129
 a nonministerial 
employee brought a claim for wrongful discharge after he was dismissed 
for complaining about the assignment of a priest who had been sexually 
abusive. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that in this context, the 
question of assignment was an unreviewable ecclesiastical question.
130
 
Most revealing of all, however, are decisions allowing adjudication of 
claims by ministerial employees against their religious institutional em-
ployers. These include, as Hosanna-Tabor signaled,
131
 matters arising in 
both contract and tort. A recent, prominent, and well-reasoned example 
is Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary,
132
 in which the Kentucky Supreme 
 
383 (2014) (arguing that contract claims between ministerial employees and their 
employers should be barred only if interpretation of the contract involves 
ecclesiastical questions). 
127
286 P.3d 357, 362 (Wash. 2012). 
128
Id. (remanding because facts not sufficiently developed to decide “ministerial 
exception” question). 
129
2011-CA-001058-MR, 2012 WL 6213759, at *8 (Ky. Ct. App., Dec. 12, 2012). 
130
Id. Note that the assignment would have been reviewable in the context of a 
suit by the victim of post-assignment sexual abuse, because it would then present the 
secular question of whether the defendants had created a foreseeable and 
unreasonable risk of harm to a third party. 
131
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 
196 (2012). 
132
426 S.W.3d 597 (Ky. 2014). 
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Court held that the ministerial exception barred a claim of race discrim-
ination by a tenured professor of Christian social ethics
133
 but that the ex-
ception did not bar the same plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract with 
respect to the conditions under which tenure could be revoked. The 
court explicitly disavowed the authority to adjudicate ecclesiastical ques-
tions that might arise under the contract, while asserting the authority to 
determine whether the Seminary’s financial exigency justified dismissal. 
The latter question was entirely secular, and therefore open for decision, 
even though the plaintiff was a ministerial employee.
134
 
Similarly, in Bigelow v. Sassafras Grove Baptist Church,
135
 the North Car-
olina Court of Appeals ruled that a pastor whose employment had been 
terminated by the church could pursue claims for compensation and dis-
ability payments promised under his contract of employment and pro-
tected by state statute. The court held that “the doctrines [of ‘ministerial 
exception’ and ‘ecclesiastical abstention’] do not bar courts from resolv-
ing contractual disputes not involving ecclesiastical issues and requiring 
only application of neutral principles of contract and statutory law.”
136
 
Tort cases offer the same analytical template. Even if the employee is 
ministerial, tort claims that do not involve evaluation of fitness for minis-
try or other ecclesiastical questions may still proceed, just as they would 
prior to Hosanna-Tabor. As before, sexual misconduct claims lead this 
pack. In Givens v. St. Adelbert Church,
137
 a Connecticut trial court rejected 
an argument that Hosanna-Tabor had altered the legal landscape with re-
spect to claims by an alleged victim of sexual abuse against a Diocese for 
negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of an abusing priest at a par-
ish school. The court allowed the negligence claim to proceed while ap-
propriately ruling that the First Amendment required dismissal of a claim 
for spiritual harm.
138
 And in Bohnert v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of San 
Francisco,
139
 a female former schoolteacher in a Catholic all-boys high 
school sued the Archdiocese for intentionally inflicting emotional dis-
tress and maintaining a hostile work environment, forbidden by federal 
and state law, by failing to correct persistent sexual harassment by stu-
 
133
Id. at 614–15. 
134
Id. at 615–21. 
135
786 S.E.2d 358, 360 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016). 
136
Id. We discuss questions of this sort in Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10, at 144–
44, 152–54. See also Shannon v. Mem’l Drive Presbyterian Church, 476 S.W.3d 612, 
618 (2015) (Tex. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that contract and tort claims against 
former employer for disparaging comments to new employer not barred by 
ministerial exception or ecclesiastical abstention doctrines). 
137
No. HHDCV126032459S, 2013 WL 4420776, at *7–9 (Conn. Super. Ct., July 
25, 2013). 
138
Id. at *9. 
139
136 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
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dents. A federal district court ruled that the teacher’s claims presented 
triable issues of fact with respect to her statutory and tort claims.
140
 
The pattern revealed in these decisions—in state and federal courts, 
over a period of over four years—is vivid, and strongly reinforces our 
analysis of Hosanna-Tabor and its jurisprudential provenance. Hosanna-
Tabor has changed nothing in the relevant law beyond offering some par-
ticularized guidance for courts to employ in deciding who is a ministerial 
employee.
141
 The immunity associated with the ministerial exception ex-
tends no further than questions of fitness for ministry. These are “eccle-
siastical questions,” beyond civil jurisdiction. Whether this immunity is 
identified as deriving from the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise 
Clause, or the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses acting in unison, is a 
matter of indifference to us. What does matter is a focused understand-
ing of what the relevant principles do and do not entail. 
Nothing in our analysis should come as a surprise. Hosanna-Tabor ex-
tended a very longstanding recognition that the Constitution precludes 
judicial determination of ecclesiastical questions. The unanimity of deci-
sion in Hosanna-Tabor is thus completely unmysterious; the decision fully 
corroborates the preexisting legal norm, and successfully points lower 
courts toward continuity in maintaining it. 
We expect that this conclusion, pedestrian as it may seem, will disap-
point those who want to expand Hosanna-Tabor into a platform for a 
broad doctrine of religious institutional autonomy;
142
 or who want to re-
rationalize the ministerial exception as an element of freedom of associa-
tion, available without regard to religious character;
143
 or who see the 
ministerial exception as a product of patriarchal wrongdoing.
144
 Part IV of 
 
140
Id. at 1116–25 (finding that Title VII claims and tort claims present triable 
issues of fact). The court discussed, but did not decide, whether Ms. Bohnert—a 
science teacher with occasional responsibilities for spiritual formation—qualified as a 
ministerial employee. Id. at 1114–15. The court also left ambiguous the question of 
whether any of the substantive claims would be affected if Ms. Bohnert did so qualify. 
Id. at 1115–16. After the district court denied summary judgment for the 
Archdiocese, in light of the disputed questions of fact remaining, the parties settled 
the case. See Nicholas Iovino, Teacher’s Spat over Up-Skirt Photos Settled, Courthouse 
News Serv. (Nov. 18. 2015), http://www.courthousenews.com/2015/11/18/ 
teachers-spat-over-up-skirt-photos-settled.htm. The Ninth Circuit, in which the Bohnert 
case arose, has held that ministerial status is not a bar to damage claims for sexual 
harassment. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F. 3d. 951, 953, 969 (9th Cir. 
2004); Bollard v. Ca. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. 1999). 
141
The Supreme Court’s multi-factor approach in Hosanna-Tabor is somewhat 
different from the approach that some circuit courts had used in earlier cases. See 
Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d. 169, 176 (5th Cir. 2012) (explaining 
the change in approach required by Hosanna-Tabor).  
142
See infra Part IV.A. 
143
See infra Part IV.B. 
144
See infra Part IV.C. 
20_4_Lupu Tuttle_Article_7 (Do Not Delete) 1/25/2017  12:58 PM 
1292 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:4 
the paper is addressed to scholars in each of those academic groups, be-
cause they alone—not the Supreme Court or the lower courts—are the 
source of polarization over the wisdom and scope of the unanimous 
opinion in Hosanna-Tabor. 
IV. HOSANNA-TABOR AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
As Part III explains, Hosanna-Tabor is constitutionally sound. Had the 
opinion rejected the concept of a ministerial exception, the Court would 
have radically departed from longstanding constitutional norms. Never-
theless, scholars have exhibited intense and quite divergent disagreement 
about the decision’s result and reasoning. 
Despite the breadth of this disagreement, canvassed later in this Part 
IV, scholars have converged on one theme in the debate about Hosanna-
Tabor—that is, the significance of Employment Division v. Smith. In light of 
contemporary conversations about the Religion Clauses, this focus is 
completely understandable. One conventional (though distorted) ac-
count of free exercise law is that it was fiercely protective of religious lib-
erty from 1963 until the spring of 1990, when Smith—without warning—
stripped away most of that protection.
145
 Smith restored the longstanding 
status quo ante, from the Court’s earliest encounter with the Free Exer-
cise Clause in 1878
146
 through the early 1960s. Nonetheless, the political 
reaction to Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith was swift and intense. This led 
Congress to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) of 
1993,
147
 purportedly designed to “restore” the pre-Smith law dating from 
1963 onward. RFRA has kept very much alive a debate about the necessi-
ty, wisdom, and constitutional imperative of religious exemptions. 
As a result, many scholars who have commented on Hosanna-Tabor 
have concentrated on its relationship to Smith. The Court’s woefully in-
adequate explanation of why Smith is not fatal to the ministerial excep-
tion inevitably magnified that attention. For example, Professor 
McConnell published an essay on Hosanna-Tabor in which he praised the 
result, argued that it rested on historical grounds, and suggested that 
overruling Smith would have been the best and most direct path to the 
ministerial exception.
148
 Professor McConnell’s essay does not so much as 
mention or cite the “ecclesiastical question” decisions on which Hosanna-
Tabor expansively and explicitly relied. That, we might say, is Smith-tunnel 
vision in the extreme. 
 
145
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1. 
146
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162–67 (1878) (holding that the Free 
Exercise Clause protects freedom of religious belief but does not protect religiously 
motivated action against laws prohibiting bigamy). Reynolds is cited with approval in 
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
147
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4(2) (2012). 
148
McConnell, supra note 45, at 823. 
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Professor DeGirolami, seemingly more resigned to current legal cir-
cumstances, has written an entire essay on the contrast between Smith 
and Hosanna-Tabor. He argues that Smith was a disaster for religious free-
dom, and that Hosanna-Tabor is too little and too late to provide much of 
a correction to the damaged law of religious exemptions.
149
 All that is left, 
he says, is “free exercise by moonlight”—dimly lit and offering little 
grounds for hope of a resurgence of a spirit of religious accommoda-
tion.
150
 
Scholars who approve of Smith seem similarly trapped by the pre-
Smith narrative of Free Exercise exemptions. Professor Gedicks, for ex-
ample, has criticized Hosanna-Tabor for “doctrinal incoherence.”
151
 He 
claims that the Court was pursuing an internally contradictory approach 
by simultaneously embracing Establishment Clause norms, which pre-
clude balancing, and Free Exercise norms, which invite balancing under 
the pre-Smith case law.
152
 
We fully recognize that Smith, and the pre-Smith regime, have had 
this grip on the consciousness of religious-freedom lawyers since the day 
it was decided. But, in considering Hosanna-Tabor, their focus on Smith is 
at best unhelpful, and at worst a mind-clouding distraction. In sharp con-
trast, our account of Hosanna-Tabor recognizes no role at all for Smith. 
The ministerial exception problem is a subset of a completely distinct 
class of controversies, in which disputes involve “strictly and purely eccle-
siastical questions.” The Hosanna-Tabor Court explicitly and exclusively 
relied on Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojevich, three of the leading decisions 
in that distinct line. 
 
149
DeGirolami, supra note 94, at 123–29; see also Marc O. DeGirolami, 
Constitutional Contraction: Religion and the Roberts Court, 26 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 385, 
404 (2015). 
150
That spirit, DeGirolami suggests, has been damaged by the movement to 
protect LGBT rights and women’s reproductive rights. DeGirolami, supra note 94, at 
131–44. He refuses to acknowledge that concern for third-party harms is a 
longstanding limitation on permissive accommodations—see Estate of Thornton v. 
Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985)—and that religious accommodations for 
business firms, even when they inflict material or dignitary harms on others, 
represent a radical extension of the appropriate scope of permissive religious 
accommodation. For rich discussion of these themes, see Martin Lederman, 
Reconstructing RFRA: The Contested Legacy of Religious Freedom Restoration, 125 Yale L.J. 
F.416, 417 nn.110–11 (2016); James Oleske, Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: 
Comparing the Unequal Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex 
Marriages, 50 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 99 (2015); Elizabeth Sepper, Reports of 
Accommodation’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 128 Harv. L. Rev. F. 24 (2014). 
151
Gedicks, Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal Incoherence, supra note 22. 
152
Id. at 421–31. Professor Gedicks’s agreement with Smith is expressed richly in 
Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious 
Exemptions, 20 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 555 (1998). 
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Cases like Yoder and Smith, which involve claims of exemption for re-
ligiously motivated conduct from general secular norms, belong to a dif-
ferent set altogether. There is no mystery about this separation of sets; 
the Smith opinion asserts it straightforwardly in its distinction of the ec-
clesiastical question cases.
153
 So the Court in Hosanna-Tabor might wisely 
have written: “As we noted in Smith, its antiexemption principle does not 
apply when the case requires resolution of a ‘strictly and purely’ ecclesias-
tical question, including fitness for ministry or the structure of religious 
governance.” This would have been far clearer than Hosanna-Tabor’s mys-
tifying pseudo-distinction between “outward physical acts” (taking peyote 
as a sacrament) and internal decisions that “affect[] the faith and mis-
sion” of the church (in Hosanna-Tabor, firing Cheryl Perich). 
Without question, lines must be drawn with respect to which cases 
involve ecclesiastical questions and which do not. Moreover, courts must 
have the authority to draw the lines between ecclesiastical and secular 
judgments. If that power were granted to religious communities, they 
would naturally and inevitably draw that line in self-interested ways. 
Whether Hosanna-Tabor presented a “strictly and purely” ecclesiasti-
cal question was not self-evident. Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojevich involved 
questions of private ordering within a religious community, so the “pure” 
quality of the ecclesiastical questions was easy to see. In contrast, Hosan-
na-Tabor touches on a matter of regulation in service of government poli-
cies against discrimination. Institutions that violate such policies impose 
significant negative externalities, including job loss and fear of retaliation 
against those who complain to the government about misbehavior by 
church officials. Accordingly, the relevant questions do not appear at first 
glance to be “purely ecclesiastical.” 
A more careful look produces a different impression. It is true that 
under most circumstances, application of regulatory norms to church 
conduct will not implicate ecclesiastical questions. Instead, such en-
forcement will pit secular regulations against religious concerns, and 
Smith will apply. In such conflicts, Smith teaches that generally applicable 
regulatory norms must prevail against free exercise objections. When 
clergy seek a determination that an adverse job action is unlawful, how-
ever, courts will frequently have to confront the ecclesiastical question of 
fitness for ministry, whether of a class or a particular person. Because 
questions of fitness for ministry are beyond the constitutional compe-
tence of the state, regulatory concerns cannot be constitutionally applied 
in this context. This is a matter of church-state boundary drawing, which 
 
153
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (distinguishing Watson, Kedroff, 
and Milivojevich because they involve the government lending “its power to one or the 
other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma”). 
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Smith fully accepts, and not a matter of interest balancing, which Smith 
rightly rejects.
154
 
Had the Court followed that line of reasoning, it would have re-
mained true to all relevant lines of cases, rather than suggesting a con-
tradiction between them. Moreover, it would have reaffirmed that it is 
judicial business to decide which questions are “strictly and purely eccle-
siastical,” in the same way it is within the judicial authority to decide who 
acts as a communicator of the faith, and therefore fits the ministerial ex-
ception. Courts mark these boundaries and then abstain with respect to 
matters within them. Smith is correct,
155
 and Hosanna-Tabor is likewise cor-
rect. 
Our explanation of the relationship between Smith and Hosanna-
Tabor suggests another reason why both friends and foes of Hosanna-
Tabor are overly focused on Smith and the historical arc of free exercise 
principles. We think Hosanna-Tabor is best justified as an instance of the 
First Amendment principle that the state may not adjudicate “strictly and 
purely ecclesiastical questions.” This principle primarily emerges from 
considerations of government competence, rather than concerns of indi-
vidual rights. Yet most of the scholars whose work we discuss in this Part 
seem indifferent at best to this line of thought. Those who support a free 
exercise-centered approach to Hosanna-Tabor are perhaps concerned that 
the “ecclesiastical question” doctrine is much narrower protection for re-
ligious entities than they prefer.
156
 Those who condemn Hosanna-Tabor as 
unsupported by contemporary free exercise principles do not want estab-
lishment clause concepts coming to the rescue of the ministerial excep-
tion. 
Hosanna-Tabor’s discontents operate from premises very different 
from ours. The final three Sections of this Part evaluate the varying ap-
proaches of these critics and explain why they are all, in different ways, 
contrary to deep commitments within our constitutional tradition. 
 
154
Id. at 884–87. 
155
In Secular Government, Religious People, we defend Smith primarily on grounds of 
lack of constitutional competence on the part of judges to decide the significance of 
religious burdens and weigh them against secular interests. Lupu & Tuttle, supra 
note 76, at 195–201; see also Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of 
Religious Exemptions, 38 Harv. J.L. & Gender 35 (2015) (criticizing all general regimes 
of religious exemptions as invitations to arbitrary judgment and unprincipled 
manipulation).  
156
In addition, some reflexively dismiss Establishment Clause principles as 
unfriendly to religion. McConnell, supra note 45, at 824 (saying the Establishment 
Clause is “an unlikely avenue for upholding a religious exemption from the 
antidiscrimination laws”). But see id. at 834 (suggesting Professor Esbeck’s article 
(Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious 
Organizations, 41 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 347 (1984)) “might serve as a jumping-off point 
for further development” of an Establishment Clause basis for Hosanna-Tabor). 
20_4_Lupu Tuttle_Article_7 (Do Not Delete) 1/25/2017  12:58 PM 
1296 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:4 
A. The Expanders—Freedom of the Church and Implied Consent Theory 
As earlier Sections of this Article explain, we think Hosanna-Tabor is 
correctly decided and that it rests unambiguously on a First Amendment 
norm of judicial disability to decide “strictly and purely ecclesiastical” 
questions. Many of the scholars discussed in this Section agree that Ho-
sanna-Tabor is sound, and that religion-specific grounds explain it. But 
these scholars part company with us concerning the respective roles of 
each religion clause, and the relevant methodology of decision. We call 
this group the “Expanders,” because they believe that Hosanna-Tabor con-
firms the idea that religious entities possess a much broader constitution-
al immunity from regulation than the “ecclesiastical question” doctrine 
would support. The “Expanders” fall into two distinct groups: 1) institu-
tional theorists and 2) implied consent theorists. 
1. The institutionalists  
 The institutionalists argue that the First Amendment’s Religion 
Clauses support a general theory of “freedom of the church.”
157
 Some go 
 
157
The earliest iteration of a church autonomy theory is found in Douglas Laycock, 
Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the 
Right to Church Autonomy, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1373 (1981). Professor Laycock later 
modified some of his views in Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 Geo. J.L. 
& Pub. Pol’y 253 (2009). Several of the chapters in The Rise of Corporate Religious 
Liberty advance and defend a variety of theories of church freedom. These include 
Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church: (Toward) an Exposition, Translation, and 
Defense, in The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty 39 (Micah Schwartzman et al. 
eds., 2016); Zoe Robinson, Hosanna-Tabor After Hobby Lobby, supra at 173; Steven D. 
Smith, The Jurisdictional Conception of Church Autonomy, supra at 19; see also Kathleen 
Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 
BYU L. Rev. 1633; Patrick McKinley Brennan, Differentiating Church and State (Without 
Losing the Church), 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 29 (2009); Perry Dane, Master Metaphors 
and Double-Coding in the Encounters of Religion and State, 53 San Diego L. Rev. 53 
(2016); Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 
44 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 79 (2009); see also Perry Dane, Master Metaphors and Double-
Coding in the Encounters of Religion and State, 53 San Diego L. Rev. 53 (2016);  John 
Inazu, The Freedom of the Church (New Revised Standard Version), 21 J. Contemp. Legal 
Issues 335 (2013); Zoe Robinson, What Is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 181 
(2014). For a detailed exploration of the relationship between the ministerial 
exception and “freedom of the church,” see Gregory A. Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and 
the Establishment Clause: Exploring the Ministerial Exception, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and 
the Freedom of the Church, 17 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 43 (2008). The editors of The 
Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty are complicit in the too-casual assertion that Hosanna-
Tabor supports theories of institutional autonomy. See Chad Flanders et al., 
Introduction to The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty, supra at xiii, xvi 
(“Proponents of freedom of the church found their views vindicated to a surprising 
extent by the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Hosanna-Tabor.”). For an 
explanation of why these theories have become prominent of late, see Paul Horwitz & 
Nelson Tebbe, Religious Institutionalism: Why Now?, in The Rise of Corporate 
Religious Liberty, supra at 221. Others recognize the trendy distinction between 
institutional and individual rights, but lament rather than praise it. For example, 
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so far as to assert that religious entities possess a form of sovereignty, sep-
arate and apart from that of the state.
158
 All of the institutionalists assert 
that religious entities have a constitutional right to control their internal 
affairs that is greater than the rights afforded to comparable secular enti-
ties. All of these scholars see ministerial employment as a quintessentially 
internal matter, and thus regard Hosanna-Tabor as an easy case for consti-
tutional protection of church autonomy.
159
 
Hosanna-Tabor does not openly reject a broad theory of religious in-
stitutional autonomy, so these approaches (unlike the others, considered 
in Part IV.B. and IV.C.) cannot be dismissed out of hand in explaining 
the decision. Nevertheless, we think none of them are constitutionally 
sound, workable, or consistent with the unanimous reasoning in Hosan-
na-Tabor.
160
 
At their roots, all theories that assign broad and unique exemption 
rights to religious entities are constitutionally flawed. In Against Religious 
Institutionalism,
161
 Richard Schragger and Micah Schwartzman have writ-
ten the most comprehensive critique of the various scholarly theories of 
freedom of the church and the related idea that churches represent 
“separate sovereignties,” free of state control over important aspects of 
their operations. We cannot reflect on all of their arguments in the space 
allotted here, but a few central points deserve emphasis. 
First, the model of “freedom of the church” is based on a singular 
church, one that claims sovereignty over all matters within its ambit of 
concern, spiritual and otherwise.
162
 Our world bears no resemblance to 
medieval Europe, in which Popes of a singular church contended with 
emperors and kings over spheres of authority.
163
 Freedom of the church 
in the United States would have to mean equal freedom for all religious 
 
Professor Gedicks criticizes Hosanna-Tabor for recognizing free exercise rights for 
institutions without weighing competing state interests, thereby producing a free 
exercise right “on steroids.” Gedicks, Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal Incoherence, supra 
note 22, at 421–33. See also Gregory Magarian, The New Religious Institutionalism Meets 
the Old Establishment Clause, in The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty, supra at 
441, 446–47.  
158
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 157, at 29–31. Smith invokes the concept of 
“sovereignty,” but his prior qualifications make the ultimate meaning of the term very 
murky. Id. at 20–27. See also Dane, supra note 157. 
159
Id. at 27; Garnett, supra note 157, at 49 & n.69. 
160
The concurring opinion of Justice Thomas in Hosanna-Tabor is the only one 
that comes close to embracing a broad theory of deference to religious institutions in 
designating which employees should be deemed as ministerial. No other Justice 
joined him in this opinion. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196–98 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
161
Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 
Va. L. Rev. 917 (2013). 
162
Id. at 926–28. 
163
Id. 
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communities, including (to mention but a few) Catholics, Protestants,
164
 
Jews, Muslims, Wiccans, and Scientologists. And it would similarly mean 
that all religious associations would have some unspecified measure of 
control over internal affairs, including employment, greater than that af-
forded all secular associations, nonprofit or otherwise. American law does 
not just fail to support any such proposition; it emphatically rejects it.
165
 
Second, the notion that any private entities should be afforded 
sweeping authority, free of state supervision, over persons and their 
property is thoroughly inconsistent with liberal democratic order. In our 
system, temporal power over persons and things must be exercised in 
ways that are subject to public accountability under that democratic re-
gime.
166
 Our constitutional arrangements do not permit the delegation of 
coercive and unreviewable authority to families or other private associa-
tions, whether these associations are religious or not.
167
 
The institutionalists’ invocation of the autonomy, freedom, and sov-
ereignty of religious entities is thus vastly overstated. Schwartzman and 
Schragger offer a compelling critique. But they, like their targets, too 
narrowly focus on the character of individuals and institutions as rights-
bearers. Jurisdictional arguments are indeed involved in the controversy 
over the ministerial exception, but these arguments arise primarily from 
the Establishment Clause.
168
 The Establishment Clause separates power 
over temporal matters, belonging to the state, from authority over spir-
itual concerns, which the Constitution removes from the state.
169
 The 
 
164
See Inazu, supra note 157, at 362–66 (discussing problems of translating 
freedom of the church from Catholic to Protestant versions). 
165
Even before the decision in Smith, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected a 
claim by the Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation for a Free Exercise exemption to the 
Fair Labor Standards Act. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 
(1985). The “Expanders” all seem reluctant to discuss this decision, perhaps because 
of the unsavory reputation of the Foundation and its founder, Tony Alamo. See Alamo 
Christian Foundation, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alamo_Christian_Foundation (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2016); see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982) (holding 
that the Free Exercise Clause does not authorize Amish employers to withdraw their 
Amish employees from the Social Security system). 
166
Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 161, at 939–45; see also Jean L. Cohen, 
Freedom of Religion, Inc.: Whose Sovereignty?, 44 Neth. J. Legal Phil. 169, 171 (2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2676141 (arguing that the 
recent strains of “‘freedom of religion’ discourse proliferating in the US and 
influencing the Court involve[] the assertion of privileges and immunities from civil 
and constitutional law, not equal rights or fair treatment under that law, thus 
undermining rather than being the paradigm of liberal rights, and threatening the 
achievements of democratic constitutionalism”). 
167
Indeed, when one state attempted to delegate such power to religious entities, 
the Supreme Court held (8–1) that the delegation was a violation of the 
Establishment Clause. Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982). 
168
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 76, at 16–20. 
169
Id. at 19–29. 
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prohibition on state resolution of “strictly and purely ecclesiastical ques-
tions” emerges from precisely such a distinction, and not from any theory 
of church sovereignty. Because fitness for ministry pertains to spiritual 
matters, it remains the exclusive province of religious authorities. Even 
within that construct, however, the state retains the authority to decide 
which positions are ministerial and therefore beyond the reach of some 
forms of regulatory power. The ministerial exception is thus supportive 
of church freedom, but is not a product of church freedom.
170
 
2. Implied consent theorists 
The second group of “Expanders” argues from individualist rather 
than institutional premises. They contend that members of religious 
communities give implied consent to policies that might otherwise be il-
legal, and that the law should give full effect to that consent.
171
 Quite un-
like the institutional theories, which have resonances of both the Catho-
lic and LDS tradition, the implied consent theories implicitly rely on 
concepts of voluntarism that are closely related to certain forms of Prot-
estantism. 
As Professor Hill has recently argued,
172
 however, participation in 
such communities may be driven by forces that vitiate full assent to insti-
tutional policies. For participants, involvement may derive from circum-
stances of birth or early childhood when awareness of institutional poli-
cies will be slim or none.
173
 Membership subsequently arises from some 
act of voluntary consent, but that tends to happen in early adolescence, 
an age at which we do not treat individuals as competent to waive im-
portant legal rights. Moreover, members of any age may be unaware of 
 
170
As should be obvious from Parts I–III, supra, and Part IV.B, infra, we do not 
agree with Schragger and Schwartzman’s attempt to force the ministerial exception 
into a more general, rights-based framework of freedom of conscience. Schragger & 
Schwartzman, supra note 161, at 974–77 (indicating hesitation over the specific result 
in Hosanna-Tabor and attributing whatever is normatively attractive in the ministerial 
exception to freedom of conscience of individuals, who are free to associate and 
select leaders in secular and religious entities alike). For reasons developed in 
Part IV.B, infra, we do not believe that constitutional principles of associational 
freedom should extend into the employment relationship, as the ministerial 
exception does. 
171
Professors Helfand and Lund are prominent proponents of such theories. See 
Michael A. Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, Implied Consent, and the Value of 
Voluntarism, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 539 (2015); Christopher Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: 
The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor, 108 N.W. L. Rev. 1183 (2013). For these 
scholars, like those in the institutionalist group, a reading of Hosanna-Tabor that takes 
religiously identified employers outside the ambit of Smith is salutary. Helfand, supra 
at 548–49 (arguing that Smith unsettled the free exercise basis of the ministerial 
exception and that Hosanna-Tabor has restored that basis).  
172
B. Jessie Hill, Change, Dissent, and the Problem of Consent in Religious 
Organizations, in The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty, supra note 157, at 419. 
173
Id. at 426–28. 
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significant institutional policies. Implied consent is a strong and unjusti-
fied inference to be drawn from membership, standing alone. 
The implied consent theorists do not limit their attention to the 
membership role. They focus broadly on the waiver of rights held by all 
employees, ministerial or otherwise, of religious institutions. Indeed, that 
breadth of the theory is one of its more troubling defects. Religious insti-
tutions employ a very substantial number of individuals in an extremely 
wide variety of positions. A doctrine that uses the concept of implied con-
sent to strip employees of substantial legal rights deeply undermines im-
portant public policies with no assurance whatsoever that employees even 
understand the rights at issue, much less the implications of forgoing 
them.
174
 
Even with respect to employees in ministerial roles, the theory of 
implied consent is defective. Although it is possible to imagine circum-
stances in which a cleric and a congregation bargain with respect to 
terms of employment, including the applicability of certain background 
norms of employment law, very few ministerial employment relationships 
will be so dependent on the bilateral agreement of the employer and 
employee. Almost invariably, a more complex set of ecclesiastical authori-
ties will have some level of involvement in the formation and termination 
of ministerial employment. The terms of the engagement will be shaped 
by canon law or comparable religious norms. Although ministerial em-
ployees voluntarily consent to ordination or other forms of entry into 
ministry, they almost never have the slightest opportunity to bargain over 
specific institutional employment policies. In these circumstances, im-
plied consent is entirely a fiction in which the religious status of both 
employer and employee are doing all the work. 
Moreover, implied consent theorists insist on describing Hosanna-
Tabor as predominantly a free exercise decision in which some form of 
interest balancing is presumptively appropriate.
175
 This is a pure misread-
 
174
Professor Helfand apparently would extend his theory to all employees of 
entities with a religious character, so long as the relevant departure from legal norms 
is made known to employees in advance. Helfand, supra note 171, at 542 (“[A] focus 
on implied consent entails a context-sensitive inquiry into whether the institution was 
sufficiently open and obvious about its religious objectives . . . .”). And he would 
include for-profit businesses in the set of entities capable of manifesting a religious 
character. Id. (“[T]he inquiry into whether an institution is . . . religious . . . has 
nothing to do with it being a for-profit or nonprofit institution . . . .”); id. at 574–78 
(suggesting the possibility that the outcome in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. is 
ultimately defensible on the basis of implied consent of the company’s employees). 
175
Id. at 549–53 (suggesting that free exercise-based strict scrutiny, involving 
interest balancing, should apply to cases like Hosanna-Tabor); Lund, supra note 171, at 
1189 (suggesting that Hosanna-Tabor “aligns . . . with Sherbert and Yoder”); id. at 1203 
(“[A]bsent some compelling government interest, the First Amendment precludes 
insiders from suing their churches over matters of significant religious concern.”). In 
other works, both Helfand and Lund reject the notion that courts are forbidden from 
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ing, rather than an interpretation, of Hosanna-Tabor. The bar on state de-
cisions of ecclesiastical questions has never included interest balancing in 
any context, ministerial exception or otherwise. And, as explained in 
Part II above, Hosanna-Tabor unanimously and explicitly repudiates such 
a methodology. 
3. Overarching problems of application  
Even if these various defenses of constitutional privilege for religious 
entities were not flawed foundationally, they remain subject to criticism 
at the level of methodology and application. First, any theory that assigns 
rights to institutions based on their religious character must determine 
which entities qualify for such a treatment. Once we get past the obvious 
category of houses of worship, identifying which institutions should 
count as religious for these purposes becomes extremely difficult. Reli-
giously-affiliated entities encompass those that deliver health care,
176
 edu-
cation, housing, counseling, and a variety of other goods and services, 
sometimes in competition with commercial providers. As Professor Kop-
pelman and others have argued, the criteria suggested in the academic 
commentary to determine which institutions constitutionally qualify as 
religious are highly vague.
177
 That indeterminacy might be tolerable if the 
only stakes were eligibility for some well-defined statutory privilege, like 
Title VII’s coreligionist exemption for employers with a primary religious 
purpose.
178
 In the context of broader constitutional theories about free-
dom of the church, however, deep and abiding uncertainty about who 
qualifies for this special freedom from regulation is debilitating.
179
 
 
deciding ecclesiastical questions. Michael Helfand, Litigating Religion, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 
493 (2013); Christopher Lund, Rethinking the “Religious Question” Doctrine, 41 Pepp. L. 
Rev. 1013 (2014). Their emphasis on individual voluntarism leads them to support 
the judicial enforceability of private agreements, without exclusion of religious 
questions that might be presented. 
176
The question of whether religiously affiliated health care institutions should 
have constitutional rights to resist state regulation is aggravated yet further by 
contractual arrangements with secular for-profit entities, under which religiously 
affiliated providers attempt to retain religiously based restrictions on service, 
including matters related to reproduction. For discussion of this growing 
phenomenon, see Elizabeth Sepper, Contracting Religion, in Law, Religion, and 
Health in the United States (Holly Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., forthcoming 
2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2783518. 
177
Andrew Koppelman, “Freedom of the Church” and the Authority of the State, 21 J. 
Contemp. Leg. Issues 145, 156 (2013); Lupu & Tuttle, Religious Exemptions and the 
Limited Relevance of Corporate Identity, in The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty, 
supra note 157, at 374-376. 
178
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012). 
179
Moreover, such criteria might incentivize religiously insincere arrangements 
by those seeking to get or remain on the constitutionally preferred side of the line. 
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 177, at 384. 
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Second, even if the criteria for identifying the constitutionally pre-
ferred religious institutions were far more definite, the methodology for 
deciding the content of these entities’ rights badly exacerbates the prob-
lem of indeterminacy. As best we can tell, for all the Expanders, that 
methodology takes the form of some kind of pre-Smith Free Exercise bal-
ancing of interests.
180
 Even if the content of that test were well-defined, 
the Supreme Court’s experience in applying it shows its considerable 
plasticity.
181
 
Perhaps the most conspicuous evidence of the indeterminacy of the-
ories of “freedom of the church,” or “implied consent,” is the persistent 
failure of many proponents of these theories to analyze situations that 
seem difficult, or to identify any cases in which religious entities should 
lose.
182
 Professor Smith makes no effort whatsoever to identify such cas-
es.
183
 In Professor Garnett’s most recent work on freedom of the 
church,
184
 he purports to “translate” that freedom into concrete terms, 
but most of what he offers are legal principles that are well-recognized 
and do not depend in the slightest on a doctrine of “freedom of the 
church.”
185
 Although he asserts that “freedom of the church” is a broader 
category than immunity from state adjudication of ecclesiastical ques-
 
180
As Professor Lederman has demonstrated, the content of that balancing test is 
itself up for grabs. See Lederman, supra note 150, at 440–41.  
181
Lupu, supra note 155, at 48–53. 
182
Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 161, at 970–74 (pointing out the 
extreme vagueness of “freedom of the church” theorists on the particulars of what 
rights their theories would grant to religious entities beyond those already afforded 
by the prohibition of judicial resolution of ecclesiastical questions). The implied 
consent theorists do better than the “freedom of the church” theorists in specifying 
analytic approaches and recommended outcomes for particular classes of 
controversies. Professor Lund’s work admirably canvasses a considerable variety of 
cases in working out his approach. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 171, at 1207–29 
(discussing a range of cases involving torts, contracts, and property through the prism 
of implied consent to the norms of the religious community); see also Helfand, supra 
note 157, at 575–77 (arguing that, viewed through the prism of implied consent, 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. may be correctly decided). But neither discusses the 
most difficult cases, including claims of sexual harassment of clergy and claims that 
religious authorities have negligently supervised clergy who have shown a propensity 
for abuse of children. The parents of these children have no authority to consent, 
expressly or by implication, to risks of this kind and magnitude. 
183
Professor Smith mentions a number of examples in his recent chapter on 
religious jurisdiction, but he lumps them all together and makes no effort to indicate 
how any of them should be approached or resolved. Smith, supra note 157, at 25–27. 
184
Garnett, supra note 157. 
185
Id. at 60–62 (Freedom of the church includes prohibitions on: 1) government 
targeting of specific faiths; 2) government compulsion of religious observance; and 3) 
government decision of ecclesiastical questions). 
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tions, he fails to offer a single example in which his theory would protect 
a religious institution in circumstances where ours would not.
186
 
In any effort at legal theorizing, details and applications matter. In 
our own attempts to define the constitutional limits on judicial decision 
of “strictly and purely ecclesiastical questions,” we have closely analyzed a 
wide range of particular contexts and questions.
187
 These include varia-
tions on the ministerial exception,
188
 but they also include issues of defa-
mation,
189
 liability for negligent supervision of clergy who commit sexual 
abuse,
190
 and contract disputes between clergy and their employers.
191
 We 
have identified easy and hard cases, and endeavored to chart an analytic 
path in difficult ones. 
Others, whose work we have challenged in this Section, should do 
likewise. The most pressing questions for them to answer, in light of the 
problems facing courts today, include whether religious entities: 1) may 
be held liable for sexual harassment of employees in ministerial posi-
tions;
192
 2) may be held liable for negligent supervision of clergy who 
commit tortious acts, sexual or otherwise, against church members;
193
 3) 
 
186
Id. at 51 & n.80. Garnett also proposes, in the name of freedom of the church, 
two concrete legal changes: 1) abandonment of the “so-called ‘endorsement test,’” 
and 2) improvement of “the version of the ‘Lemon test’ that is applied in public-
funding cases,” so that we no longer ask whether government support advances 
religion but inquire instead “whether the government program . . . creates an 
institutional relationship . . . that is reasonably characterizable as a religious 
‘establishment.’” Id. at 61–62. Both of these moves are quite obviously designed to 
weaken Establishment Clause constraints on state power to support religious causes 
and entities. Whether or not these are good ideas, these supposed “translations” of 
church freedom are not aimed at freeing “the church” from any regulatory 
constraints. Instead, they represent expansions of state power to support those 
entities and their missions. Moreover, in at least some contexts, those expansions of 
state power threaten rather than protect the religious freedom of individuals. See, e.g., 
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). Why the Religion Clauses should 
be read to reduce individual religious freedom, while expanding state power to 
promote religion and the freedom of religious institutions, is not something the 
defenders of these theories are quick to acknowledge or explain. 
187
See generally Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10; see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. 
Tuttle, Same Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 274, 284–
85 (2010) (distinguishing between secular and ecclesiastical definitions of marriage, 
and arguing that the state may specify the former but not the latter, which is reserved 
for religious communities). 
188
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10, at 138–46. 
189
Id. at 155–60. 
190
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 105, at 1851–56, 1851 n.243 (citing decisions 
allowing claims of negligent supervision to go forward). 
191
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10, at 152–54. 
192
See, e.g., Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); 
McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 844 (N.J. 2002). 
193
See, e.g., Enderle v. Trautman, No. CIV.13-01-22, 2001 WL 1820145 (D.N.D. 
Dec. 3, 2001); Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993). 
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should be constitutionally free from prohibitions on sex, age, or disability 
discrimination, or from legislative fair labor standards, with respect to 
non-ministerial employees;
194
 and 4) should be free to terminate employ-
ees, ministerial or otherwise, in violation of contractual terms that do not 
involve evaluation of fitness for ministry.
195
 
If their theories produce results identical to ours, the differences 
among all these ideas may be purely rhetorical. On the other hand, if 
some theories are designed to produce a wider form of autonomy for re-
ligious entities than the “ecclesiastical question” doctrine, their propo-
nents should be prepared to defend those specific results. 
If they remain mute in the face of this challenge, however, it will 
suggest that they have no good response to the problem of indetermina-
cy, or are simply unwilling to oppose the interests of religious entities. Ei-
ther way, courts should continue to reject their theories as constitutional-
ly infirm.
196
 It is impossible to believe that all of the Hosanna-Tabor Justices 
were operating on theories so flawed. 
B. The Re-Rationalizers—Secular Freedom of Association 
A number of critics of Hosanna-Tabor assert that its principal defect is 
that the ministerial exception protects only religious employers. To these 
scholars, religious institutions and religiously motivated actors are not 
entitled to constitutional treatment superior to that afforded to their 
secular counterparts.
197
 
 
194
For example, would they question the result in EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 
781 F.2d 1362, 1365–70 (9th Cir. 1986), which held that Title VII prohibits a religious 
employer from paying men more than women, on the religious ground that only men 
can be the head of a household? 
195
Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 587, 590 (finding that 
courts may adjudicate legality of dismissal of tenured theology professor on ground of 
financial exigency).  
196
As we note in Part III, the lower court decisions, pre- and post-Hosanna-Tabor, 
all line up with our view. Courts recognize no general doctrine of church autonomy 
for “internal matters.” Whether or not the case involves a ministerial employee, the 
relevant question is whether the issue involves ecclesiastical determinations; if and 
only if it does, the claim is barred. See, e.g., Bohnert v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of 
S.F., 136 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1114–15 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (explaining that teacher’s claims 
of sexual harassment may go forward because they present no questions of her fitness 
for religious duties); McCallum v. Billy Graham Evangelistic Ass’n, No. 3:09CV381-
RLV, 2012 WL 4756061, at *5–7 (W.D.N.C, Oct. 5, 2012) (rejecting church autonomy 
defense regarding claim of race discrimination by nonministerial employee); 
Buscetto v. St. Bernard High Sch., No. CV116011089, 2014 WL 4494362, at *3 (Conn. 
Super. Ct., July 25, 2014) (rejecting “entanglement” defense in case involving 
dismissal of whistleblower regarding misuse of funds). 
197
This view is strenuously urged by Lawrence G. Sager, Why Churches (and 
Possibly, the Tarpon Bay Women’s Blue Water Fishing Club) Can Discriminate, in The Rise 
of Corporate Religious Liberty, supra note 157, at 77 and Schragger & 
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In the particular context of the ministerial exception, the argument 
takes the form that all associations, religious or secular, should be equally 
bound (or not) by the law of nondiscrimination in employment. Hosan-
na-Tabor involved an elementary school teacher with relatively limited re-
sponsibilities for religious instruction.
198
 And the precise question was 
whether the school was free to ignore laws about retaliation against those 
who complain of disability discrimination by an employer.
199
 Is there a 
remotely plausible claim of a constitutional right of freedom of associa-
tion, not specific to religion, in these circumstances? 
Lawrence Sager is the leading advocate for such a rights-based theo-
ry, applicable to the problem in Hosanna-Tabor. In his earlier work with 
Christopher Eisgruber,
200
 and in a recent book chapter,
201
 Professor Sager 
has asserted a theory of close (or intimate) association, available to 
members of secular and religious groups alike, which he claims is an ap-
propriate constitutional rerationalization of Hosanna-Tabor. Sager’s work 
is influential, and others in the academy may find his argument seduc-
tive, so it seems worth the effort for us to point out its profound flaws. 
Sager begins by offering a proposition which he claims “enjoy[s] very 
broad—if not universal—assent: As a matter of political morality, the 
Catholic Church is entitled to insist that its priests be male without inter-
ference from the state.”
202
 Why would that proposition be a widely shared 
matter of political morality? In fact, within the Church, there is consider-
able dissent about the exclusion of women from the priesthood.
203
 That 
the priesthood is patriarchal is a matter of both ancient practice and 
equally ancient criticism. We suspect that a significant number of Catho-
lics would be at least somewhat gratified if the state insisted that an all-
male priesthood is contrary to strong public policy, and removed tax ex-
emptions from religious entities that bar women from clergy status.
204
 
 
Schwartzman, supra note 161. This was the approach taken unsuccessfully by the 
Government in its brief in Hosanna-Tabor. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 189–90 (2012). Schragger and Schwartzman 
do not offer a view of whether Hosanna-Tabor was correctly decided, though it is 
difficult to see how their individual conscience-based premises could possibly align 
them with the Court. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 161, at 975. 
198
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 178. 
199
Id. at 176–77. 
200
See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom 
and the Constitution (2007). 
201
Sager, supra note 197, at 77. 
202
Id.  
203
There is an active movement within the Catholic Church for the ordination of 
women as priests. See About Us, Women’s Ordination Conf., http://www. 
womensordination.org/about-us/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2016). 
204
In Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the Supreme Court 
upheld the revocation of the tax exempt status of a university that prohibited 
interracial marriage or dating among its students. Racial distinctions are frequently 
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So the right to maintain an all-male priesthood is not necessarily a 
widely held proposition of political morality, but it remains a constitu-
tional norm, unanimously affirmed in Hosanna-Tabor. Sager suggests four 
possible explanations for the church’s right to discriminate. Two of them 
involve assertions of religious autonomy—either as a general proposition 
related to religiously-motivated action, or as a more limited right of au-
tonomy held by religious institutions.
205
 Following the argument that he 
makes in more extended form in his coauthored book, he rejects these 
on the grounds that religion is not entitled to this kind of special treat-
ment as compared with its secular counterparts.
206
 
Our sharp disagreement with Sager arrives when he dismisses his 
third suggested explanation, which focuses on state decisions involving 
ecclesiastical questions. He characterizes this category of cases as impli-
cating the state’s “obligation of neutrality among religious faiths,”
207
 an 
obligation which he then describes as an antidiscrimination or antidis-
paragement principle. And he breezily brushes it aside as an “indirect” 
way of protecting what he calls the “first order” principle that it is 
“wrong . . . to tell the Catholic Church that it must hire women priests.”
208
 
Sager completely misunderstands the prohibition on state decision 
of ecclesiastical questions. This is precisely the ground of Hosanna-Tabor, 
and it does not rest on a concern for disparagement or discrimination. 
Instead, it rests on a constitutional denial of the state’s competence to 
decide a certain class of questions, such as qualifications for ordination, 
or the structure of church authority.
209
 For a state to have an exclusively 
secular character, some questions must be outside its jurisdictional 
boundaries. In order to decide which questions those are, religion must 
 
seen as far more odious than those based on gender, and the Bob Jones case involved a 
university and its students, not a church and its criteria for ordination. In the 30-plus 
years since the Bob Jones decision, the IRS has never threatened such a move against 
entities that support an all-male priesthood. See Sam Brunson, The Church Will Not Lose 
Its Tax Exempt Status, By Common Consent (July 9, 2015), https://bycommonconsent. 
com/2015/07/09/the-church-will-not-lose-its-tax-exempt-status/ (arguing that, in light of 
longstanding IRS practice, churches that oppose same sex marriage will not 
jeopardize their tax exempt status). We are by no means recommending a revocation 
of tax-exempt status for entities that impose gender-based restrictions on ordination, 
and we think that such a move would indeed raise serious constitutional questions. 
But we also think that those questions would involve Establishment Clause disabilities 
on government power to regulate the clergy, not freedom of associational rights 
applicable to all organizations. 
205
Sager, supra note 197, at 77–78. 
206
For reasons of our own, we agree that the Free Exercise Clause does not 
ordinarily compel religious exemptions from generally applicable norms. See Lupu & 
Tuttle, supra note 76, at 195–210. 
207
Sager, supra note 197, at 78.  
208
Id. at 85. 
209
See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); 
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
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have a distinctive meaning for Establishment Clause purposes—
otherwise, how will we ever explain why a public school may sponsor a 
daily recitation of “Ode on a Grecian Urn” but not the New York State 
Regents Prayer;
210
 why the government may build and operate a National 
Museum of African-American History but not a National Cathedral; or 
why any particular practice is an establishment of religion? 
Having specifically dismissed the true grounds of decision in Hosan-
na-Tabor, Sager moves on to what he views as the correct explanation for 
the right of the Catholic Church to insist on an all-male priesthood. The 
operative norm, he asserts, is the right of “close association.”
211
 This right 
is not limited to religion-based relationships, but extends more broadly 
to close associations of all kinds. This idea of close association, he writes, 
finds its paradigm in a dyadic relationship
212
—for examples, the relation-
ship between spouses, priest and penitent, or psychiatrist and patient—
but can be extended into group association among congregants, and be-
tween congregants and their leaders. The right of close association ex-
tends to all groups, including groups like his imaginary Tarpon Bay 
Women’s Blue Water Fishing Club,
213
 which he claims should have the 
same right as religious groups to choose its “Guides” without interference 
from the state. 
That members of voluntary associations should be free to choose 
leaders who will reflect the members’ deepest concerns is a normatively 
attractive idea. But it utterly fails to account for what Sager promises to 
explain—why the Catholic Church can insist on an all-male priesthood. 
Taken in its totality, the Catholic Church is about as far from a close as-
sociation as one can get. In its worldwide scope, the Catholic Church has 
thousands of ordained officials, responsible for everything from supervi-
sion of priests to the management of real property and adjudication of 
disputes arising under canon law.
214
 
This quintessentially bureaucratic structure bears no resemblance to 
the “close associations” that Sager asks us to envision. Members of indi-
vidual Catholic parishes do not get to choose the priests who perform 
their rituals and sacraments.
215
 Bishops and others in the hierarchy make 
those assignments, and the hierarchy is not selected by any form of dem-
ocratic participation.
216
 Although individual lay Catholics may choose a 
confessor, or which Masses to attend, these core matters of close associa-
 
210
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
211
Sager, supra note 197, at 85–89, 97. 
212
Id. at 86–87, 99. 
213
Id. at 88. 
214
See Frequently Cited Church Statistics, Ctr. for Applied Res. Apostolate, http:// 
cara.georgetown.edu/frequently-requested-church-statistics/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2016). 
215
See Canon Law Soc’y of Am., Code of Canon Law (1983) at 840–1165. 
216
Id. at 49, 139. 
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tion have no direct bearing on employment relationships within the 
Church. Who is employed as a priest in a particular parish, a bishop in a 
particular diocese, or an archbishop in a particular archdiocese is a 
choice made by hierarchical officials, not by an association of equal 
members of the faith community. The Catholic model is a complete mis-
fit for the supposed principle of close association. Accordingly, Sager’s 
attempt to explain why the Catholic Church is free to discriminate in 
employment of clergy totally collapses. 
Other religious organizations will vary tremendously in the degree of 
close association they represent. In some faiths, congregations and their 
members may be actively involved in selecting teachers, preachers of the 
faith, or other religious leaders. Members of Baptist, Jewish, or Islamic 
communities, for example, may be heavily involved in selecting their 
teachers and ministers.
217
 Other faith communities, by organization or 
size, operate on very different models. Only the most influential mem-
bers of mega-churches, of the sort led by pastors like Joel Osteen,
218
 will 
have any voice in the choice of pastor. 
Hosanna-Tabor, however, insulates equally every religious community, 
close association or not, from state supervision in the choice of religious 
teachers and spokespersons. Sager’s attempt to rerationalize the ministe-
rial exception as an illustration of the right of close association cannot 
possibly be sustained. 
Moreover, Sager’s “close association” story clashes with the premises 
of Hosanna-Tabor, which explicitly rejects the government’s argument 
that the Constitution protects secular and religious employers alike.
219
 
The Court’s version, which rests exclusively on the Religion Clauses, is 
precisely to the contrary. Nor does Sager’s theory readily encompass 
Cheryl Perich, a teacher who was hired and fired not by the parents and 
children whom she would teach, but instead by school and church offi-
cials. He tries to brush this off as a case at the boundary,
220
 but the awk-
ward fit between Perich’s role and Sager’s image of close association fur-
ther undermines his attempt to rerationalize the ministerial exception as 
an example of close associational rights. 
 
217
See, e.g., Edward T. Hiscox, The Baptist Church Directory: A Guide to 
the Doctrines and Discipline, Officers and Ordinances, Principles and 
Practices of Baptist Churches (1859); Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim 
World (Richard C. Martin ed., 2004). 
218
Osteen is the pastor of Lakewood Church, the largest Protestant congregation 
in the U.S. He preaches weekly to over 40,000 churchgoers who attend in person, and 
millions more who watch on television. Joel Osteen, Lakewood Church, https://www. 
lakewoodchurch.com/Pages/new-here/Leadership-Team.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 
2016). 
219
Sager, supra note 197, at 89–90.  
220
Id. at 100–01. 
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Sager’s strained effort to cleanse religious specificity from a unani-
mous decision that bluntly asserts religion specificity is further marred by 
the damage it would do to principles of nondiscrimination law in other 
contexts. The Catholic Church is not a close association, but some for-
profit business or professional firms might claim—with far more credibil-
ity—to be just such an enterprise. Picture a law firm with 20 lawyers, as 
well as support staff. The lawyers are all Orthodox Jews, or Evangelical 
Christians, or Sunni Muslims. They subscribe to a set of religious values, 
and a commitment to daily worship, with which they want to inform their 
law practice. Accordingly, they insist on hiring only fervent members of 
their own faith as lawyers, paralegals, and other staff. Should the princi-
ple of close association permit this firm to discriminate in employment 
on the basis of religion? The Supreme Court has never suggested that 
constitutionally based freedom of association extends to the employment 
relationship,
221
 and it would betray the profound commitment of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to permit associational freedoms to impede equal em-
ployment opportunity.
222
 Sager’s account of the principles beneath the 
ministerial exception, however, might well do just that.
223
 
We understand the impulse to rerationalize Hosanna-Tabor in this 
way. It is the inevitable product of overstating the Free Exercise dimen-
sions of the case and wholly underappreciating its Establishment Clause 
roots. Professor Sager’s chapter, which spends pages on Smith and the 
narrative arc of Free Exercise exemptions,
224
 is a prime exemplar of this 
conceptual mistake. But a right of close association will not get him 
where he wants to go with religious institutions, and it will take him to 
places with other entities where we suspect he will flinch at the implica-
tions. Hosanna-Tabor is not about a right of close association, and a con-
 
221
The Supreme Court’s leading cases on the right of expressive association do 
not involve the employment relationship. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 
(2000); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 
(1995). The ministerial exception of course involves exactly that relationship. 
222
 Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 
(2012)) exempts employers with a primary religious purpose from the prohibition on 
religious discrimination in employment, and the Supreme Court upheld the 
permissive accommodation reflected in this coreligionist exemption in Corp. of 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 
(1987). But this limited inroad on equal employment opportunity is not 
constitutionally compelled with respect to nonministerial positions, and in any event 
is best understood as permitting religious entities, like comparable value-oriented 
secular entities, to hire only those committed to their cause. The coreligionist 
exemption has never been extended to for-profit employers. For discussion, see Lupu 
& Tuttle, supra note 177, at 393–94. 
223
He appears to sense this problem without engaging with it. Sager, supra note 
197, at 89 (“[T]he collision between the equality demands and the associational 
demands of social justice could be extreme, and the pressure . . . would cause us to 
consider more closely the scope and robustness of associational norms.”). 
224
Id. at 89–94. 
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stitutional right of close association should not extend to the employ-
ment relationship. There is no mystery whatsoever why a unanimous Su-
preme Court rejected the government’s attempt to offer an overarching 
theory of association, secular and religious alike, to explain the legal 
permissibility of an all-male Catholic priesthood. Professor Sager’s theory 
deserves the same disposition. 
C. The Dissenters—Feminism and the Ministerial Exception 
Over the past 30 years, the most persistent academic critics of the 
ministerial exemption have been women.
225
 They know that the most 
common categorical exclusions from the clergy are based on sex. And 
they also know that ministerial exception cases in U.S. courts frequently 
involve claims of covert discrimination based on sex. To put it bluntly, in 
operation the ministerial exception tends to be detrimental to women 
who are clergy, or teachers in religious schools. This is a matter of regret, 
and this is why judicial unanimity in favor of Hosanna-Tabor seemed ex-
tremely unlikely. How would the religious employer get the votes of Jus-
tices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor? 
Moreover, the arguments that feminist critics of the ministerial ex-
ception have advanced over the years are certainly plausible. For exam-
ple, Professor Corbin’s prominent and well-developed work on the sub-
ject focused heavily on Smith, and its holding that the Free Exercise 
Clause does not support religion-based exemptions from generally appli-
cable rules.
226
 Professor Corbin defines very narrowly the class of cases 
that present ecclesiastical questions, off-limits to courts, as those that in-
volve religious “doctrinal disputes.”
227
 This leads her to emphasize, along 
with Smith, the decision in Jones v. Wolf,
228
 which teaches that courts may 
resolve property disputes within a religious community if they can do so 
using only secular principles of trust, corporate, property, and contract 
law, and thereby avoid ecclesiastical questions. 
Our primary objection to Professor Corbin’s view is her apparent 
willingness to allow courts to adjudicate questions of fitness for ministry. 
 
225
See, e.g., Robin West, Freedom of the Church and our Endangered Civil Rights: 
Exiting the Social Contract, in The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty, supra note 
157, at 399; Brant, supra note 24; Corbin, supra note 24; Griffin, supra note 24; 
Rutherford, supra note 24. One of the coauthors of this piece originally shared the 
view that the ministerial exception could not be constitutionally defended, see Ira C. 
Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment 
Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 391 (1987), but has since recanted, see Lupu & Tuttle, 
supra note 76, at 90 n.177. 
226
Corbin, supra note 24, at 1981–2004 (arguing that Smith undercuts the free 
exercise basis for the ministerial exception). 
227
Id. at 1984–85. Her attempt to force Milivojevich, which involved the question 
of termination of a high level church official, into this mold is particularly strained. 
228
443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
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As we argued in Part III, adjudication of whether an adverse job action is 
based on ministerial performance or is a pretext for unlawful discrimina-
tion will inevitably touch on standards of good ministry. In such cases, 
the ministerial exception represents an exercise in constitutional prophy-
laxis, steering courts away from the forbidden territory of adjudicating 
the quality of ministerial performance and protecting religious employ-
ers from adjudicative mistakes. 
We recognize that reasonable people can differ about the wisdom of 
a prophylactic rule in this context. For scholars in the dissenting camp, 
adjudicative mistakes that permit discriminatory firings are far worse than 
adjudicative errors that pressure religious entities to tolerate unaccepta-
ble performance in ministry. In a world in which the size, frequency, and 
direction of errors will always be uncertain, the ministerial exception ap-
pears to some as a blunt and destructive instrument. 
If our disagreement with these scholars were limited to the question 
of utility with respect to pretext adjudication, we might share their puz-
zlement about unanimity (though not correctness) in Hosanna-Tabor. But 
we think there are deeper questions being masked in the terms of the 
debate, and that highlighting these questions helps to resolve the puzzle. 
Foremost, we note that recent work by many scholars in this camp does 
not aggressively challenge the right of religious communities to explicitly 
discriminate based on sex in determining eligibility for the priesthood. 
Some steer around the question;
229
 others assert that religious communi-
ties may have such a right, as a constitutional
230
 or statutory matter,
231
 but 
these scholars seek to minimize that right. 
 
229
Corbin, supra note 24, at 2014, barely mentions the case of overt 
discrimination, and notes only that it presents no “entanglement” with religious 
entities because they fully admit what they are doing. See also id. at 2029–31 
(suggesting that freedom of expressive association might protect an all-male ministry, 
but not purporting to resolve the case).  
230
Professor Hamilton’s brief in Hosanna-Tabor appears to concede that faith 
communities may choose to have an all-male ministry. See Brief of 
Bishopaccountability.org et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 21, 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) 
(No. 10-553), 2011 WL 3532696. 
231
Leslie Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 Ind. L.J. 981, 1015–16 (2013), 
suggests that sex might qualify under Title VII as a bona fide occupational 
qualification (BFOQ) for ministry. But Professor Griffin makes little effort to fit the 
argument into the narrow legal channels of what counts as a BFOQ; limits her 
analysis to the Roman Catholic Church; and relies explicitly on an answer to a long-
disputed ecclesiastical question of the sort that courts are forbidden to answer. Id. at 
1017 (citing Catholic authorities for the proposition that “theologically speaking only 
men can represent Jesus . . . .”). See also Brief of Amici Curiae Law and Religion 
Professors in Support of Respondents at 30, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 3532698 
(suggesting that freedom of association might constitutionally protect an explicitly 
all-male priesthood). 
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What might explain this reticence to tackle the core question? Per-
haps it is a matter of pragmatic or strategic argument. Explicitly gender-
based priesthoods are so deeply embedded in large and ancient faiths 
that it may seem a kind of folly to challenge those head-on. It seems far 
easier to argue only that faiths that purport not to discriminate should be 
held to their word. In such faiths, discrimination against women clergy 
would have to be hidden behind alternative, pretextual explanations, and 
adjudication designed to flush out such pretexts becomes a way to force 
these religious communities to practice the policy of equal employment 
opportunity that they preach. 
On close inspection, however, giving a pass to overt discrimination 
while attacking the covert variety cannot be defended. If sex discrimina-
tion in employment is a moral wrong, deeply at odds with our civil rights 
tradition, the overt discriminators are by far the graver offenders. This is 
so as a matter of symbolism, because overt exclusion sends the stark, pa-
triarchal message that women are wholly unqualified for the socially pres-
tigious position of the priesthood. Overt discriminators are also far more 
harmful as a matter of quantitative impact, because they exclude all 
women rather than an occasional “troublesome” one. From the state’s 
policy perspective, is it not a far superior outcome that some women may 
serve in the priesthood of a particular faith than none? It seems odd in 
the extreme to find liability for the lesser offense of occasional and covert 
sexism, while ignoring the greater and more damaging offense of blatant 
exclusion of women. 
Two arguments might be advanced in favor of allowing pretext adju-
dication but not permitting direct legal challenges to explicit disqualifi-
cation based on sex or other protected characteristics. The first rests on 
the idea that any religious organization that holds itself out as an equal 
opportunity employer should be estopped from raising the ministerial 
exception. The estoppel argument, however, is conceptually flawed. 
Equal employment policies within religious organizations never take the 
form of an employer’s waiver of legal defenses to a statutory cause of ac-
tion. Instead, these policies invoke a substantive norm of equal oppor-
tunity to which the organization commits itself, without any reference to 
available legal rights or remedies. 
The second argument in favor of adjudication of pretext relies on a 
policy of incentives for accountability, whereby only those who openly 
discriminate in hiring receive the benefit of the ministerial exception. 
This move involves imposition on a religious community of external legal 
standards—in this context, standards of publicity—for the enterprise of 
ministry. Recall that the Court describes “the authority to select and con-
trol who will minister to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly ecclesiasti-
20_4_Lupu Tuttle_Article_7 (Do Not Delete) 1/25/2017  12:58 PM 
2017] THE MYSTERY OF UNANIMITY 1313 
cal’ . . . —[as] the church’s alone,”
232
 without regard to whether the rea-
sons for action qualify as religious. If the boundary imposed by Hosanna-
Tabor between the state and the church thus cannot be breached by 
strong, substantive policy norms against status discrimination, far weaker 
legal policies involving transparency or accountability should not change 
the outcome. 
The most forceful, frontal attack on the ministerial exception comes 
from Professor Robin West. In recent work, she has attacked the excep-
tion as “a vivid example of a . . . deeply troubling family of rights . . . ‘exit 
rights.’”
233
 As Professor West eloquently describes the problem, exit rights 
permit their holders to escape hard-earned and essential elements of the 
social contract. She includes a number of rights, including the right to 
bear arms, in the category of exit, but her primary target is the doctrine 
of freedom of the church, including what West sees as its corollary, the 
ministerial exception.
234
 To recognize such an exception from laws regu-
lating equality of opportunity, she argues, is “to break faith with and to 
undermine the shared national project of creating a world of equal op-
portunity and full participation that is free of racism and sexism and 
their related effects . . . it is . . . both a civic and political breach as well as 
a moral and contractual wrong.”
235
 Nothing in West’s bold argument sug-
gests that she would treat overt discrimination as less deserving of con-
demnation than the covert variety.
236
 Indeed, her premises are most di-
rectly implicated by explicit exclusion of women from the priesthood. 
West is rightly concerned about the effect of full exit rights for any 
set of institutions on the longstanding civil rights settlement in favor of 
inclusion, equal opportunity, and equal respect for all. For these and 
other reasons, we reject any general notion of freedom of the church. 
Such a freedom has never been part of our constitutional arrangements. 
A so-called pluralist doctrine of separate sovereignty represents precisely 
the claim of exit from the social contract that Professor West decries, with 
potentially destructive consequences for children and others vulnerable 
to religious authority, unaccountable to law and democratic processes. 
 
232
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)). 
233
West, supra note 225, at 402. 
234
Id. at 402–03. 
235
Id. at 400–01. 
236
Id. (“[I]t is not at all clear why our nation’s ministers, rabbis, and imams, 
whether they are ministering or teaching, should not be drawn from the full and 
diverse American public rather than one racially or sexually determined segment of 
it, no less than are our nation’s public and private school teachers, police forces, 
firefighters, professors, healthcare professionals, service providers, and retail, factory, 
and construction forces. It is even less clear why the churches, synagogues, and 
mosques that hire and fire them should be explicitly permitted to do so partly on the 
basis of their race, sex, age, ethnicity, or able-bodied-ness.”). 
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Where we part company with Professor West is in linking the minis-
terial exception to a broad idea of separate sovereignty, or constitutional 
autonomy, for churches. Our defense of Hosanna-Tabor does not rest on 
the narrative that she attacks so powerfully. Instead, our position is a re-
minder that the U.S. has a number of deep and abiding constitutional 
settlements. Without question, these include the Reconstruction com-
mitment to equal protection, and the statutory embodiments of the egali-
tarian norms that characterize the late 20th and early 21st centuries. But 
that commitment does not exclude all prior constitutional settlements. 
The Reconstruction Amendments must be continuously harmonized with 
what came before and retains lasting value. For example, reconciling 
freedom of speech with equality is one prominent context in which 
American law has engaged in just such an effort to harmonize evolving 
and cumulative constitutional norms.
237
 
Perhaps a less obvious, but equally vital, candidate for this treatment 
is the longstanding constitutional commitment to a state that maintains 
its secular character. One key element of that character is the prohibition 
on state resolution of ecclesiastical questions—among others, the fitness 
of particular persons for ministry. Excluding the state from regulation of 
criteria for ministry is inevitably in tension with the norms that Professor 
West emphasizes. Nevertheless, we think that the ministerial exception, 
limited to employees engaged in transmission of the faith, appropriately 
integrates Religion Clause principles with competing normative consid-
erations. 
We do not expect Professor West to agree with that judgment, but we 
hope that she and others who are inclined toward her vision can see that 
the unanimous opinion in Hosanna-Tabor is not a mysterious, tragic, in-
coherent, or dangerous move toward subversion of America’s egalitarian 
promise. The decision is far narrower than that. It does not permit reli-
gious entities to exit from the social contract. For obvious and important 
illustration, the decision gives no protection to religious entities that dis-
criminate on legally forbidden grounds (such as sex or race) with respect 
to nonministerial employees. Furthermore, the state retains the authority 
to decide which employees are ministerial and which are not. 
CONCLUSION 
Hosanna-Tabor commanded the assent of nine Justices who had re-
peatedly disagreed about a wide variety of other church-state questions. 
 
237
For broad judicial affirmation of the need to protect expressive freedom, even 
when it is in tension with norms of equality, see Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) 
(holding that First Amendment protects utterers of viciously anti-LGBT speech from 
liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress), and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating City’s hate speech ordinance on its face as content 
discriminatory). 
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Unanimity strongly suggests that this particular controversy did not in-
volve a radical reinterpretation of the Free Exercise Clause; or a bold and 
hazardous new move with respect to associational freedom; or a stark and 
sweeping right of exit from egalitarian norms. Instead, Hosanna-Tabor re-
affirmed the limited competence of a secular state. That reaffirmation 
richly deserved the imprimatur of a unanimous Supreme Court. 
 
